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ABSTRACT

LAND GRABBERS, TOADSTOOL WORSHIPPERS,
AND THE SAGEBRUSH REBELLION IN UTAH, 1979–1981

Jedediah S. Rogers
Department of History
Master’s of History

In 1979, a handful of Nevada state officials sparked a movement to transfer the
large unappropriated domain to the western states. For two years what became known as
the Sagebrush Rebellion swept across the American West like brushfire, engaging
westerners of all stripes in a heated dispute over the question of the public lands. In
Utah, as elsewhere in the West, public officials, rural ranchers, miners, developers,
academics, environmentalists, and concerned citizens joined the debate and staked sides.
This episode underscored western relationships between people and nature and featured
contests over competing ideologies in the West. But it probably did more harm than
good in solving the problems of the West and even further polarized westerners against
themselves. After just two years in the limelight, however, the Sagebrush Rebellion
unspectacularly faded into public memory, partly as a result of environmental opposition

but mostly because Ronald Reagan’s administration steered public land policy in a new
direction. Interior Secretary James Watt took steps to appease disgruntled westerners by
loosening federal regulations on the public lands, but he opposed any efforts for a largescale transfer. Thus the Sagebrush Rebellion ultimately failed; but still today the
sentiment and conflicts that propelled it persist, continuing to color the panorama that is
the American West.
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PREFACE

In its chambers on February 15, 1979, the Nevada State Legislature nearly
unanimously passed a bill that would transfer a large portion of the public domain owned
by the federal government—about 48 million acres of the state—to Nevada. This action
cannot be easily explained, for it was in response to a variety of western grievances and
ill feelings that had been present in the West for some time. But it was a sentiment that
was widely felt and which set off a popular movement to assert control of the West. John
Rice, a reporter who attended the legislative session, was said to have coined “Sagebrush
Rebellion” to evoke the disgruntled emotions that were present at this particular session.
This term would be tossed around widely for the next two years—in newspaper
articles and editorials, in legislative bills and congressional reports, in environmental
newsletters, and more. The sagebrush rebels and their opponents debated the term’s
usefulness, but the name stuck. It unmistakably pinpointed the movement in the arid
West, the vast tract of land west of the hundredth meridian that receives less than 20
inches of water annually. This is important since the term “rebellion” addressed the
discontent that had been brewing for quite some time by fed-up westerners against what
they considered an overbearing federal government.
Some rebels argued that the term “rebellion” was a misnomer because the
movement to transfer the land operated within legal and constitutional bounds. True, no
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heads rolled, but the Rebellion was bloody in a rhetorical sense. Some rebels resurrected
colonial rhetoric by referring to the movement as “the second American Revolution,” an
epic conflict over colonial rule by an absentee landlord. A no-holds-bar was made in
referring to environmentalists and like-minded conservationists as “selfish,” “radical,”
“dandelion pickers,” and “a cult of toadstool worshippers.”
For their part, opponents fired back. Harkening back to the days of the Old West
when cowboys, sodbusters, and other enterprising westerners were said to have freely
roamed the range, environmentalists called the movement nothing more than a traditional
western “land grab.” It was, in their view, an overt attempt to assert control of the land
and its resources for practically nothing. In fact, this was the mother of all land grabs, for
never before had westerners demanded title to so much land. Active environmentalists
and other opponents labeled the rebels’ motives as little more than greed, some attaching
pejorative names to the movement such as the “sagebrush ripoff, “cowpie confrontation,”
or “cheatgrass mutiny”; Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus called it “an attempt to
hornswoggle all Americans out of a unique land heritage.” This emotive and sometimes
offensive rhetoric spewed out by both camps caused emotions to broil and was one
reason why the Rebellion grew to such a heightened state of agitation.
But on both sides the rhetoric underscored some real and legitimate grievances.
Uncle Sam owned—and still does—most of the land in the West. In Utah, two-thirds of
the land was federally owned, as compared to about 87 percent in Nevada, 64 percent in
Idaho, and 48 percent in Wyoming. Richard White and other historians of the U.S. West
have argued that “more than any other region, the West has been historically a
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dependency of the Federal government.”1 In a real sense, the federal government has had
a significant presence in the West. Land policy percolates from Washington D.C.;
western states receive money from the federal government in lieu of taxes, but they do
not receive taxes from the land since they do not own it. As a result of this federal
“intrusion,” many westerners have resented the disruption of long cherished ways of
living and of their perceived status as “second-class citizens.” To some, the grievances
that came to a head during the Sagebrush Rebellion have lain dormant for over twentyfive years; for others, and especially rural people who still struggle to make a living on
the land, these issues continue to run thick in their veins and make their hair stand up
beneath their Stetsons. Mention the Sagebrush Rebellion to cattlemen in southeastern
Utah and their facial expressions will stiffen. I did to several rustic ranchers in Castle
Valley, Emery County, and each took the time to sit down with me and rattle off their
grievances.
Situated directly east of Nevada, Utah is the Silver State’s sister state in many
ways, both geographically and economically. So when Nevadans took up the crusade to
win back the land within the state borders it did not seem out of place for Utahns to join
them. Sagebrush rebels from both rural and urban Utah played an integral role in
championing the cause and disseminating information to a national audience. Likewise,
opposition to the Sagebrush Rebellion in Utah was better organized and more potent than
elsewhere in the West. This thesis attempts to tell the story of both the sagebrush rebels
and their environmental opposition, highlighting the major personalities, issues, and
events in Utah during a two-year period beginning in 1979.

1

Richard White, “It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own”: A History of the American West
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 57.
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Historians have yet to tell the full story of the Sagebrush Rebellion in the West.
Several studies try to make sense of the legal or constitutional rightness or wrongness of
the Rebellion, which is the beyond the scope and purpose of the present study.2 General
histories of the American West and the American environment generally mention the
movement, albeit briefly in no more than a few paragraphs. Most of these normally
discuss the Rebellion in terms of Nevada or the collective West.3 General histories of
Utah and its counties briefly mention it, moreover, but not in any exhaustive way.4 In
fact, historians have yet to fully understand the impact and significance of the Sagebrush
2

See Dina Titus, “The Sagebrush Rebellion: A Question of Constitutionality,” in Battle Born:
Federal-State Conflict in Nevada During the Twentieth Century, ed. by A. Costandina Titus (Dubuque,
Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company), 150–61.
3
Only one paragraph was dedicated to it in Michael P. Malone and F. Ross Petersons’ essay,
“Politics and Protests,” in The Oxford History of the American West, eds. Clyde A. Milner II, Carol A.
O’Connor, and Martha A. Sandweiss (Oxford University Press, 1994), 529–30; also White, ‘It’s Your
Misfortune and None of My Own’, 567–68; Carl Abbott, The Metropolitan Frontier: Cities in the Modern
American West (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1993); Robert Gottlieb and Peter Wiley, Empires in
the Sun: The Rise of the New American West (New York: Putnam, 1982). The Rebellion is discussed at
some length in Hal K. Rothman, The Greening of a Nation? Environmentalism in the United States since
1945 (Orlando, Florida: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1980), 174–80. See also William R. Lindley,
“From Oregon’s Range War to Nevada’s Sagebrush Rebellion,” Journal of the West 38 (Jan., 1999): 56–
61.
A few studies examine the movement more thoroughly than do general surveys of the American
West. William Graf’s Wilderness Preservation and the Sagebrush Rebellions (Savage, Maryland: Rowman
& Littlefield, 1990), dedicates several chapters to it and provides a useful overview of the history of public
lands controversy from what he calls the first sagebrush rebellion in the nineteenth century to the fourth one
in the late 1970s. However, Graf fails to utilize essential primary sources, instead relying almost entirely
on secondary source material. More useful for its usage of primary sources is C. Brant Short’s Ronald
Reagan and the Public Lands: America’s Conservation Debate, 1979–1984 (College Station: Texas A&M
University Press, 1989), a rhetorical analysis of the pro-development and pro-preservationists in the debate
over public lands. Two of his first chapters analyze the arguments and counterarguments of sagebrush
rebels and their opponents. It is interesting that Short begins his discussion in 1979, a year before Reagan
was elected, as if to suggest that the debate over the public lands in the 1980s really began with the
Sagebrush Rebellion. His dissertation, which became a book, actually begins not in 1979 but in 1980, the
year of Reagan’s election.
The best study to date on the Sagebrush Rebellion is R. McGreggor Cawley’s Federal Land,
Western Anger: The Sagebrush Rebellion and Environmental Politics published by the University of
Kansas Press in 1993. Cawley is primarily concerned with resource policy and the way in which the
Sagebrush Rebellion influenced the direction of this policy. Cawley argues, rightly I believe, that the
Rebellion was “an authentic political movement,” motivated by economic self-interest and a genuine belief
in individual rights. He also maintained that the aim to transfer land was likely “a bargaining tactic used to
deemphasize environmental values in public land policy.”
4
See Thomas G. Alexander, Utah, The Right Place, Revised Ed. (Salt Lake City: Gibbs M. Smith,
2003), 424–25; Scott M. Matheson and James Edwin Kee, Out of Balance (Layton, Utah: Gibbs M. Smith,
1986), 124; Richard A. Firmage, A History of Grand County (Salt Lake City: Utah State Historical Society
and Grand County Commission, 1996).
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Rebellion on the local and state level where most of the politicking and debate took place,
and it is the purpose of this study to present a detailed account of the movement with
Utah as a case study. It will be seen that the activity of sagebrush rebels and their
opponents varied from state to state; the course of the Rebellion certainly took different
turns in Utah than in the neighboring states of Nevada, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, and
Arizona. But it will also be noted that arid western states have bonds of commonality;
through an in-depth look at the Utah experience general themes may be deduced.
In this case study I draw primarily on newspaper articles, oral interviews, and
manuscript materials at the Utah State Archives; Special Collection at Utah State
University in Logan, Utah; and Special Collections at the University of Reno–Nevada.
Chapters I, II, and V are broadly chronological. The first is a brief review of public lands
in the United States and the controversies that have arisen on those lands. I break up the
events of 1979, 1980, and 1981 into the other two chapters, where I discuss the main
players and events associated with this movement. The middle chapters are topical—the
first an in-depth look at the rural reaction, and the second an analysis of the anti-rebel
opposition. The final chapter, as well as the chapter on the opposition, tracks the
Sagebrush Rebellion to its conclusion in 1981 as a viable political movement, partly a
result of environmental pressure but more due to new directions in land policy
established by the Reagan administration.
The pages that follow are meant to tell a story—a story that moves from the urban
to the rural, from public conference to private meetings, from significant events to key
players on both sides. This is a story about people and land, and the forces that gave
shape to this relationship in the late 1970s and early 1980. My hope is that readers will
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begin to understand the tension and variance at work as the two opposing sides debated
the meaning and the appropriate use of the public lands. The hope is that this story will
not only be an accurate narration of what happened over twenty-five years ago, but that it
will illuminate general themes and issues that continue to make the modern American
West so unique. Land has traditionally been one of these issues and it seems certain,
judging by the relatively recent manifestations during the Sagebrush Rebellion, that it
will continue to be so.
Kristen Rogers-Iversen kindly gave me the idea for the topic of this thesis. It
turned out to be a winner, and for that and the encouragement she offered along the way,
thanks. Edwin Iversen read an entire draft of the thesis and made useful comments.
Appreciation goes to my graduate committee—my chair, Thomas G. Alexander, and
committee members, Brian Q. Cannon and Ignacio M. Garcia. My association with these
fine scholars made this thesis immeasurably better and my graduate experience a
memorable one. I received financial assistance from the Charles Redd Center for
Western Studies and the History Department at Brigham Young University and
appreciate their confidence. Since much of this thesis was written at home, thanks to my
darling son, Isaac, for putting up with a preoccupied dad. And thanks to Holly, whose
contributions are much too numerous to mention here, but whose love and support made
this all possible.
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I.
THE PUBLIC LANDS

There is nothing that will make the average westerner see red so quickly and so vividly as
the question of the public lands.
Utah Governor George H. Dern, 19261

The sentiment expressed by Governor Dern in the epigraph may surprise many of
us for whom the public lands are far removed from the daily routine and the structure of
our lives. Could not Dern have mentioned some other “western” issue instead—perhaps
even the question of water, which was of pivotal importance and passion in the
nineteenth- and twentieth-century West and remains so today? But he said public lands,
and he undoubtedly meant it. Many westerners have long resented the fact that the public
domain is, after all, public, belonging not to the state or to private interests but to the
federal government.2 Since Uncle Sam took control of the public lands in the eighteen
and nineteenth centuries, easterners and westerners have debated how best to manage and
dispose of them. The questions of what to do with the public lands and whose interests
they serve have long polarized not only the West and the East, but the West against itself.
The reasons for this are rooted in a long history of controversy in the West; the divisive

1

Dern speech, School Land Titles in Public States, July 27, 1926, Special Collections, J. Willard
Marriott Library, University of Utah, Salt Lake City.
2
Benjamin Hibbard defines the public domain to be that area that was at one time owned by the
United States and subject to transfer through federal laws. Hibbard, A History of the Public Land Policies,
7. Technically, however, public land refers to that land currently managed by the Bureau of Land
Management and which once had been under the General Land Office. The federal government also owns
national forest lands and national park lands, but these are not considered public lands or the
unappropriated domain.
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sentiment of the late 1970s was simply a continuation and a manifestation of this
heritage.3
The creation of a vast public domain was a gradual process. The notion of land
titles was a European one and foreign to the native peoples who inhabited the Americas.
Even prior to the American Revolution, European imperial nations or the colonies owned
most of the land in the “New World.” By the eighteenth century, several colonies—
notably Virginia, New York, Connecticut, and Georgia—claimed or were granted
through royal grants or charters large tracts of land west of the Appalachians.
Overlapping claims, however, made it difficult to determine who had legitimate
ownership of the land. Distribution was unequal, before and after the Revolution, since
not all colonies or states could claim title to western land. Following the war, states
either sold their western lands to pay off war debts or ceded them to the federal
government “for the common benefit of all U.S. citizens.” By 1814, with Georgia being
the last to cede its domain, the United States had acquired all title to western lands
formerly claimed by the original colonies.
With the western lands originally held by the states safely in its hands, the federal
government expanded its public domain at a remarkable rate. Congress acquired millions
of acres through treaty, conquest, or exploration, which became part of a sprawling

3

Historiography on the public lands is extensive. See Benjamin Hibbard, A History of the Public
Land Policies (New York: Macmillan, 1924); Marion Clawson and Burnell Held, The Federal Lands:
Their Use and Management (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1957); Paul W. Gates, History of Public
Land Law Development (Washington D.C.: Public Land Law Review Commission, 1968); Everett Dick,
The Lure of the Land: A Social History of the Public Lands from the Articles of Confederation to the New
Deal (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1970); Roy M. Robbins, Our Landed Heritage: The Public
Domain, 1776–1970, 2nd ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1976); William Voigt, Jr., Public
Grazing Land: Use and Misuse by Industry and Government (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press,
1976); William K. Wyant, Westward in Eden: The Public Lands and the Conservation Movement
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982). For a concise overview, see Paul W. Gates, “An
Overview of American Land Policy,” Agricultural History 50 (January 1976): 213–29.
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empire that stretched from coast to coast. In 1803 Jefferson bought 523,446,400 acres
from the French and in so doing stretched the nation from the mouth of the Mississippi
River to the northern boundary of California northward. The territory of Florida was
acquired in 1819 from Spain; much of the disputed Northwest procured in 1846 from the
British; vast tracts of land west of the hundredth meridian obtained from Mexico in the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo of 1848; territory from the Republic of Texas secured in
1850; and a strip of land on the Arizona and Mexico border bought in the Gadsden
Purchase of 1853. By 1867, with the acquisition of Alaska from Imperial Russia, the
nation stood as it exists today, with the notable exception of Hawaii and imperial land
holdings in the Pacific and the Caribbean.4
While it was obtaining large tracts of land, the government disposed of it with
equal zeal. Disposal was a primary concern in the nineteenth century for several reasons.
In the late eighteen and early nineteenth centuries, the United States sold its lands with
the purpose of producing revenue to pay back war and other debts and to construct
internal improvements. In time, when most of the war debts had been paid, disposal of
the public lands became a means of national development, a means to move the masses
westward for the purpose of expanding the nation’s borders and its democratic citizenry.
Western land in the hands of small and independent farmers, not large corporations, was
the ideal that in practice was difficult to realize.5
In 1785 the colonies passed a land ordinance which gave land grants to war
veterans and to Indian tribes. Two years later, the Land Ordinance established a method
to carve out states from the public domain, replacing the system of “metes and bounds.”

4
5

Wyant, Westward in Eden, 20–24.
Hibbard, A History of the Public Land Policies, 3.
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It was a rectangular survey system, which called for the creation of townships, each
divided into 36 square mile sections or 640 acres. Sections were divided even further for
settlement and sold by auction. A Surveyor General in the Treasury Department oversaw
the disposal before 1812, when the General Land Office (GLO) was established under the
auspices of the Treasury Department. In 1849 the GLO became part of the newly formed
Interior Department, and in each state a land office opened with a surveyor general who
oversaw the survey of the land and a receiver and register who distributed it.6
As western states were carved from the public domain, each state had to petition
for lands before being admitted to the Union, under the “organic acts” passed by
Congress. At first only section 16 of each township was given to each state for the
support of schools and other public facilities; in 1848 this increased to two sections—16
and 32. Utah and Arizona received four sections in each township, though much of this
land held little real value. But these states got comparatively little of the land than what
remained in the ownership of the federal government. In fact, most western states had a
provision in their constitutions that disavowed any claim to title to the public domain.
Nevertheless, through the nineteenth and into the twentieth century a central goal
of the federal government was to dispose of as much of the public lands as possible, and
Congress enacted countless acts and provisions for this purpose. A 1796 land law
allowed settlers to buy on credit land at the minimum of $2 per acre, preventing
speculators from buying up large tracts of land at ridiculously low prices. In the
following decades, additional land laws would be passed amending this 1796 law; after

6

Dick, The Lure of the Land, 35. In Utah a land office wasn’t established until 1869. For a
discussion of land ownership in Utah before the creation of the land office, see Lawrence L. Linford,
“Establishing and Maintaining Land Ownership in Utah Prior to 1869,” Utah Historical Quarterly 42
(Spring 1974): 126–43.
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1820 the land was mostly disposed through sales at a price per acre of $1.25 and the
minimum purchase of 180 acres. But even at low prices, farmers made the payments
only with difficulty. Land claim associations helped squatters bid for lands when they
were offered for sale, and corporations bought up the land to resell at inflated prices.
People who already settled on a tract of land pleaded for preemption so their land would
not be lost at auctions. In general, the government moved during the 1840s from the sale
of large areas through auctions to reserving 160 acres for settlers, first through
preemption and after 1862 through homestead and preemption until the repeal of
preemption in 1891. Preemption rights gave settlers and “squatters” the first chance to
purchase the land, in the words of one historian placing the settler “on an equal basis with
the speculator in competition for land.” People also got land by purchasing land warrants
issued for various purposes such as colleges.7
The passage of homestead laws in the mid-nineteenth century facilitated new
opportunities for the small farmer and marked a new development in the system of land
disposal. In the first half of the nineteenth century disposal had been mainly through
credit and cash sales; in 1862 this changed with the passage of the Homestead Act, a
virtual land give-away allowed a head of household to gain title after five years of a
quarter section—160 acres—if “improvements” could be shown after five years. The
only cost required was a small fee to file the claim.8
Homesteading had its problems. At the standard rate of $1.25 per acre, most
settlers probably procured land through lawful means and abided by the laws of
Congress, but fraud also took place under the homestead acts. Some men and women

7
8

Robbins, Our Landed Heritage, 25, 36, 89–91; Dick, The Lure of the Land, 7–8, 55, 103.
For more on homesteading, see Gates, History of Public Land Law Development, 387–434.
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went to great lengths to acquire land under the Preemption Act, which required “proof of
the settlement and improvement” of the land. Stories are told of homesteaders who
earned title to the land after showing “improvements” of merely “a foundation of four
logs.” Some even gained title by moving the same cabin from claim to claim until each
quarter section had been granted title status; others were said to have won title through
false testimony.9
The lion’s share of the land, however, went to railroad companies. Beginning in
1835 and as late as the end of the 1880s these companies and states who aided in the
construction of western railways acquired enormous land grants from the federal
government—perhaps as much as 318 million total acres. In 1852 Congress gave
railroads “100-foot right-of-way” and stone and timber rights to the land. Land grants
were particularly luring to those who began construction on transcontinental lines. There
was, however, a general dislike of large corporations or capitalists owning large tracts of
land. The federal government tried to keep large blocks out of the hands of speculators
and cattle ranchers by pushing for land reforms to limit the number of acres individuals
could acquire and to do away with outdated land laws. The companies did sell off much
of the marginally suitable land for agriculture to either speculators or unsuspecting
individuals for homesteading, but in many instances the land grants were never opened
up for settlement.10
In the 1870s and into the 1880s the federal government made attempts to settle the
far or “arid” West. But the Timber Culture Act (1873), the Deseret Land Act (1877), and

9

Dick, The Lure of the Land, 112–14; also “The Land System: The Problem of Speculation,” in
America’s Frontier Story: A Documentary History of Westward Expansion, ed. Martin Ridge and Ray
Allen Billington (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), 618–19.
10
See Gates, History of Public Land Law Development, 341–86.
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the Timber Cutting Act (1878), which passed millions of arid acres into private
ownership, were mostly failures and unsuitable to the climate and geography of the land.
Case in point was the Desert Land Act—the legislation that enabled westerners to acquire
640 acres of “desert land that would not, without irrigation, produce agriculture.”
Scraping out a living on this kind of desert land was a back-breaking and sometimes
impossible endeavor. People at home and abroad came to claim their free tract of land,
but they came with little knowledge of agriculture and the new environment they would
make home. Most poor farmers could not afford to build the ditches to irrigate the land
and most wealthy farmers would not expend the money necessary to irrigate.
Consequently, this act was not used widely, by either farmers or cattlemen.11
John Wesley Powell, the one-armed intrepid explorer who thrice made his way
down the Colorado River, was one of the first to report to Congress the nature of the arid
lands and to suggest that settlement would not be easy. In his Report of the Lands of the
Arid Region of the United States, submitted to Congress in 1878, he suggested that if the
current settlement laws were not modified environmental deterioration would result.
Powell was part of a growing movement concerned with the protection and the
responsible management of the public lands, and when he became head of the U.S.
Geological Survey he tried to chart a new direction for land-use policy. Most of his ideas
were never implemented, or at least slow to influence federal policy. But they would
have a lasting impact into the twentieth century. The year of Powell’s death in 1902

11

Hibbard, A History of the Public Land Policies, 453–55, 570; Gates, History of Public Land
Law Development, 399–401, 638–43. For the act in Utah, see Stephen W. Stathis, “Utah’s Experience with
the Desert Land Act,” Utah Historical Quarterly 48 (Spring 1980): 175–94.

13

marked the passage of the Reclamation (or Newlands) Act and the beginning of
government-coordinated water reclamation in the West.12
During most of the nineteenth century, federal land agencies disposed of the
public lands and did little else. This changed in 1891 when Congress passed the General
Revision Act which repealed the preemption acts and, for the first time, established a
means to manage the land. The act also granted the U.S. president power to carve out
forest reserves from the public domain, much to the vexation of westerners. Grover
Cleveland set apart 21 million acres of forest reserves in 1897 only ten days before
leaving office—the so-called “Midnight Reserves”; by the end of Theodore Roosevelt’s
second term he had set apart a total of 132 million acres. Congress also set apart public
land as National Parks. Before 1900 these included Yellowstone, Yosemite, King’s
Canyon, Sequoia, and Mount Rainier.
Gradually a long-standing policy of land disposal and what one historian calls
“the golden age of private ownership”13 gave way to a policy of permanent federal
ownership of the public lands. By the 1920s the federal government still owned around
186 million acres of what had originally been nearly 1.4 billion in the public domain.
Even still, while the designation of forest reserves or national park status excluded large
tracts of land from private ownership, westerners generally had the freedom to access and
use the public lands as they pleased.14 Federal management of the public lands tried to
impose some semblance of order for those who worked on the land. A classic example is
12

For a discussion of Powell’s career, see Wallace Stegner, Beyond the Hundredth Meridian: John
Wesley Powell and the Second Opening of the West (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1954).
13
Wyant, Westward in Eden, 52.
14
Donald C. Swain, “Conservation Accomplishments, 1921–1933,” in The American
Environment: Readings in the History of Conservation, 2nd ed., Roderick Nash, ed. (Reading, Mass.:
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1976), 142. The federal government leased the land to miners and
to cattlemen and sheep herders for their livestock, which grazed in the forest reserves and on the
unappropriated public domain.
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cattle ranching. Before the introduction of permits and grazing fees on public lands,
cattle, sheep, and eager homesteaders roamed free, but they did not mix well on the “free
grass.” Cattlemen had fits over the swarms of sheep on the land mainly because they ate
the grass to the roots and left only undesirable forage for the cattle that followed. In the
nineteenth century “range wars,” as they came to be known, could be violent; stories are
told of cattlemen erecting fences, shooting sheep, or driving large numbers over steep
cliffs.15 But in 1905 the newly established Forest Service introduced a system of permits
and fees on forest reserves. By the close of the First World War, the Department of
Agriculture oversaw the grazing of an estimated 200,000 cattle and 800,000 sheep.16
Because so many livestock used the public lands, much of it lay in desperate need
of revitalization. New plant species replaced the native ones where the land had been
overgrazed, and desert brush replaced the long, lush grasses native to the West. In some
areas, the land became practically worthless as soil composition diminished in its
productivity. Some efforts were made to reduce the number of livestock on the land, but
the land remained poorly managed with few mechanisms in place to regulate.
In the 1930s, the federal government took monumental steps to restore the range
land and to protect watershed areas from deterioration. Under Franklin Roosevelt’s
“New Deal” and headed by his secretary of Interior, Harold L. Ickes, the Soil Erosion
Service and, later, the Soil Conservation Service were created. The Forest Service took
steps toward range restoration. The Secretary of Agriculture called for “drastic
15
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reductions of stock on overgrazed ranges,” and Congress appropriated large sums of
money for reseeding the range land where cattle and sheep had overgrazed. These efforts
made some gains, but they were not entirely successful. The Interior Department
reported in 1946 that the range was about 50 percent efficient despite the fact that in the
previous 12 years some $10 million had been spent on range improvements.17
Other measures would be implemented to manage the vast unappropriated public
domain. The most lasting and controversial one was the Taylor Grazing Act, passed in
1934 and the brainchild of rancher Edward T. Taylor of Colorado. The act carved out of
the public domain grazing districts (limited to 80 million acres, and in 1935 expanded to
142 million acres) to be federally regulated and issued a special directive to classify the
lands. The Taylor Grazing Act marked the first time the Interior Department received the
charge for “the management, development, preservation, and conservation” of much of
the public domain. Also, it effectively withdrew the remaining public lands from
homesteading, with some exceptions.18
The federal government also made some changes in the organization of the
bureaus charged with overseeing the management of the public lands. In August 1941
the Forest Service moved its headquarters to the heart of the West in Salt Lake City, but
that lasted for only a couple of years. That was probably “a very bad move,” at least
according to one Forest Service employee, mainly because “you were setting yourself
right out there in the middle of your opponents and they [cattlemen] were harassing many
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of the Grazing people [Forest Service personnel] to death.”19 So, headquarters were
quickly relocated in Washington D.C. Interior Secretary Ickes proposed in the 1930s to
transfer the forest reserves to his Interior department from the Agricultural department;
during the same time Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace proposed a
consolidation of all federal land holdings under the umbrella of the Department of
Agriculture for the purpose of avoiding “unnecessary duplications, excessive
expenditures, and fundamental differences in policies, and to obtain the highest efficiency
in administrations and the maximum service to users,” in his own words.20 Neither of
these changes was made, however. Instead, in 1947 Congress created from the General
Land Office and the Grazing Service (established in 1939) one mother bureau, the Bureau
of Land Management (BLM), within the Interior Department.21
In the decades that followed, and especially in the 1960s, Congress passed various
pieces of management legislation. In the post-war decades the BLM and the Forest
Service began to shift from custodial management to intensive management. By the
sixties, the BLM oversaw an array of activity on the land: making range improvements,
issuing grazing and mining permits, maintaining public records, building new recreation
facilities, and classifying the public lands.22
Another post-war development was the explosion of environmentalism as a potent
political force. Historians have noted several reasons for the emergence of an
environmental ethic. This was an era of increasing urbanization and suburbanization,
19
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which was reflected in an increasing urban demography in the West. The cultural divide
between suburban and rural America became even more evident following the war.
Social critics began to note the detrimental effects of a consumerist society that placed a
premium on getting. Environmentalism eventually became a cause in which concerned
citizens rallied to save dwindling resources and to preserve a high quality of life. In
1961, Rachel Carson’s classic book, Silent Spring, was published, revealing the
poisoning effects of the pesticide DDT.
The result was a mobilization of grassroots environmental participation on a scale
never before seen. Public opinion began to favor environmental organizations, which
rose in publicity, funding, and membership. Between 1960 and 1972 the Sierra Club
increased its membership more than 10 times over, from 15 to 136 thousand, and more
than doubled that by 1983 to 346 thousand. A plethora of new organizations formed,
beginning in 1967 with the Environmental Defense Fund.23
This widely popular environmental ethos translated into specific pieces of
legislation designed to minimize the human impact on the earth. Some of these were
specific to the public lands. The National Wilderness Preservation Act in 1964 set apart
land for wilderness designation; the National Environmental Policy Act in 1969 (NEPA)
and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970 increased regulation on western
lands and redefined patterns of resource administration. In addition to the legislation,
congress set up a Public Land Law Review Commission to determine the future of the
public lands.24
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This commission was created in 1964 by Congress for the purpose of determining
the future of the public lands. Appointed by the president and congressional leaders,
commission members conducted the study “aided by a staff, an advisory council,
Governors’ representatives, and over nine-hundred witnesses at public meetings.” Five
years later and at a cost of more than $7 million, the commission issued its official report,
One Third of the Nation’s Land. Its general recommendation was that the public domain
should remain federal property, the final step in substantially rolling back the earlier
federal policy of land disposal. The commission also made 137 other recommendations,
among these that the government make payments to states in lieu of the property taxes
they would have received had they owned the land, that Congress review the proposals in
which large tracts of land are disposed, that land planning programs and land use studies
be made, and that “dominant zoning” be created to determine what type of activity should
take place on the land. It advocated multiple-use management for the purpose of assuring
“environmental quality and, at the same time, encourage healthy economic growth.”25
The findings of the committee met a mixed reaction in the West. The idea of
federal retention of the public domain made many westerners shudder with the thought of
“social ownership.” Other than that, it seems inevitable that not all westerners would
agree with the recommendations of the report, particularly those whose activities on the
land would be curtailed in the name of multiple-use. But the western states governors,
meeting to discuss the findings of the report in Denver, expressed their optimism with the
report. The main uncertainty was whether the findings leaned in the direction of states’
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rights or dominant federal control. The answer to this would depend on what changes
were made through congressional legislation.26
That question was answered in 1976 with the passage of the monumental Federal
Land Policy and Management Act, also known as FLPMA or the Organic Act of 1976. It
did not overturn outdated grazing policies or the archaic Mining Law of 1872, but it did
mandate wilderness. The most controversial part of FLPMA was its opening statement,
which read, “The Congress declares that it is the policy of the United States that the
public lands be retained in federal ownership.” This direction signaled the passing of the
frontier and the virtual end of public land disposal, with some exceptions. Since the 1891
General Revision Act and at least since the establishment of the Grazing Service and the
BLM, the federal government had drifted in the direction of retention over disposal.
Before 1891 it had been the sole policy of the federal government to dispose of the land,
but developments in public land policy in the twentieth century pointed to federal
retention and long-term management of the land.
The general move to retain land in the hands of the government found continuous
resistance and periodic rebellion among certain westerners, notably since the 1920s. In
the mid-1920s, Senator R. M. Stansfield held hearings in which westerners expressed
their discontent over proposed increases to grazing fees in the forest reserves.27 In the
summer of 1929, Secretary of the Interior Ray Lyman Wilbur reportedly suggested
turning over most of the public domain to the states. But the proposal was not as alluring
as might be expected—it would grant only the surface rights to the public domain and
would not include National Parks, Monuments, or Forests.
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George Dern, Utah’s governor, first heard of the proposal from Joseph M. Dixon,
Assistant Secretary of the Interior. Dern responded six weeks later at the Conference of
Western Public Land States in Salt Lake City. The offer was nothing but a sham, he told
the attendees. The land was useless without the right to the minerals and resources and
little more than a desert expanse. The government had long since tried to give this kind
of land away, but nobody would take it. If the states took it they would inherit a damaged
range, high costs for infrastructure improvements, and the reduction or discontinuance of
the Biological Survey which aids in the “eradication of predatory animals.”28
Dern also expressed another grievance that would be resurrected in the Sagebrush
Rebellion: the idea that the western states were not on an “equal footing” with the East.
In his mind, the West had a rightful claim to not just the surface but to the mineral rights
and to the national forest lands. Not all conference attendees opposed receiving the
surface rights of the public lands, but nearly all shared Dern’s frustration with that
“arrogant bureaucracy,” the Interior Department. Dern’s speeches certainly reflected the
anti-federal government sentiment that abounded in the West during this time.29
Despite this opposition, however, the proposal enjoyed the backing of Herbert
Hoover who put together a committee to investigate the issue. Composed of nineteen
members, led by James R. Garfield, an attorney who had been Secretary of Interior in the
Theodore Roosevelt administration, the Garfield Commission made its recommendations
in January 1931. It suggested that the unappropriated public domain be placed under
“responsible administration or regulation,” and that lands “not important for defense,
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reclamation, reservoir sites, national forests, national parks, national monuments, bird
refuges, etc.” ought to be granted to the states for management. The states were to be
given ten years to gain title to the land, but after that time the land would become a
permanent fixture to the national domain. The recommendations of the commission were
never accepted by Congress, in large part because of western and conservationist
opposition. This left, according to one historian, the federal government solely
responsible to manage the public domain “with its own methods of regulation.”30
In the 1940s similar proposals were made to transfer the federal domain out of the
ownership of the federal government. In 1946, Senator Carl A. Hatch from New Mexico,
who was chairman of the Public Lands Committee, supported a transfer of the public
domain to the western states (though he did not also include national forest and national
park lands), but he never did introduce a bill. Senator Edward V. Robertson, a cattle and
sheep rancher from Wyoming, introduced a similar proposal that same year, S. 1945,
except he also proposed transferring forest and range land that was more valuable for
grazing and agriculture than for timber. The bill also provided for a commission in each
state to oversee the transfer of the land to private interests. The land would first be
offered for sale to those who held grazing permits on the land at a price per acre of
somewhere between 9 cents and $2.80; in Utah, where grazing lands were said to have
carried an average of about 10 animal units per acre, the price per acre would be about 88
cents.31
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Perhaps what generated the most press and the most controversy were a series of
hearings chaired by Nevada Senator Patrick McCarran and Wyoming Senator Joseph C.
O’Mahoney. In hearings, speeches, and meetings, the two senators and witnesses spoke
against the Forest Service and its efforts to protect watershed areas from deterioration.
They also led an intensive investigation of the Grazing Service and protested recent
proposals to slash allotments and to raise grazing fees from 5 cents to 15 cents Animal
Units per Month (AUM). With the primary intention of bringing down the fees cattlemen
paid to graze their cattle on the land, McCarran introduced S. 33 and various versions of
this same bill which were designed to give ranchers title to the land as a “vested right.”
None of these bills ever passed, though Congress did reduce the budget and the personnel
of the Grazing Service as a result of these investigations.
The American National Livestock Association and the National Woolgrowers
Association were said to have endorsed a transfer at a meeting held in Salt Lake City in
August 1946 by McCarran and O’Mahoney. The executive secretary of the Livestock
Association reportedly justified this idea in Denver on the basis that ranchers sought
“stability of operations.” Chances were unlikely that the land would become privatized,
but even if it did, he said, cattlemen would be forced to be good keepers of the land due
to economic necessity.32 In 1947, Frank A. Barrett, a congressman from Wyoming, held
a series of hearings in which cattlemen called for a transfer of the forest reserves to the
states, or at least to the BLM, which had been kind to western cattlemen. Congress
authorized the hearings and the Barrett committee, beginning in Washington D.C. and
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making its way into seven western states, began the task of scrutinizing public land
administration.33
These hearings and legislation met stiff opposition among westerners and
easterners alike. Editorials in eastern magazines and newspapers and in several western
newspapers, including the Salt Lake Tribune, denounced these hearings; the Denver Post
disparagingly dubbed it “Stockman Barrett’s Wild West Show.” The rhetoric against a
transfer centered on public welfare. Several editorials argued that continued overgrazing
would spell ecological disaster—a shortage of food, dust bowl reprise, and flooding.
This doom-and-gloom rhetoric differed from what would be said thirty years later when
opponents of the Sagebrush Rebellion would speak of public welfare in terms of beauty
and heritage, not immediate needs.
The most vituperative and probably effective opposition came from the pen of
Bernard DeVoto, a native of Ogden, Utah, who in a series of articles in Harper’s
magazine attacked cattlemen and their western interests.34 Despite his western roots,
DeVoto’s characterizations could be harsh as he poked fun at the drawl, diet, physical
appearance, and recreational pursuits of many westerners. DeVoto’s purpose was to
acquaint his readers in the East to the West, which he had recently toured, and to
denounce what he called “one of the biggest land grabs in American history.”
One theme DeVoto struck was the notion of the West in a sort of civil war. In his
view, the West seemed eager to ally itself with the very interests it despised—“to hold
33
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itself cheap and its eagerness to sell out.” Those in the West who sought title to the land
were actually the large outfitters, cattle companies, and western interests “so small
numerically as to constitute a minute fraction of the West.” DeVoto’s damning articles
accused these interests of determining to destroy the West of its lifeblood. In fact, the
privatization of western land would not have a salutary affect on the western economy; it
would undo the policy of sustained yield and “sixty years of conservation of the national
resources.”35
Westerners were never unanimous in their opposition over the issue of state
ownership of the land, but those who were in opposition effectively silenced McCarran
and the others who advocated a transfer. Some attempts for a takeover were made in the
1950s, but these were feeble and never made much headway. In the postwar West,
increased urbanization probably played a role in diminishing support for a transfer. Not
for another thirty years would westerners make another serious bid for the state
ownership of the public domain. In the late 1970s, as in the 1940s, opponents of a
transfer were mostly westerners or at least intimately familiar with the West. In both
instances, proponents of the land transfer criticized “absentee landlordism,” advocated
states’ “equal rights,” and assured the public that only a small portion of the lands would
ever become private property. The parallels between the two episodes are striking.
Thus, the so-called Sagebrush Rebellion drew from a long history of western
discontent regarding the federal ownership and management of the public lands.
Protesters of the 1970s and 1980s had just as much to be angry about, if not more than
their western counterparts in the 1940s, and this will become clear in the ensuing chapter.
In any case, for several years the Sagebrush Rebellion consumed the energy of westerners
35
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and polarized the West. Rebellion officially began in Nevada then percolated into the
neighboring state of Utah until it became clear that, in the words of one Utah state official
in mid-1979, “many users of the public domain in Utah are about ready for another
Boston Tea Party.”36
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II.
THE REBELLION

The Sagebrush Rebellion is a confrontation, struggle and battle that will hopefully remain
peaceful. But like the most successful battles in past history, the attack should come from
more than just one unit and more than just one front.
Norman Glaser, U.S. Senator from Nevada

With the passage of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA),
westerners began to devise a strategy through which to challenge federal ownership of
the public lands. What became known as the Sagebrush Rebellion and the idea to
transfer the lands to the states was not the product of one person or group but a multigroup response to what many perceived to be one of the grossest inequities in federalstate relations. Eventually, sagebrush rebels decided to pursue their goals on multiple
fronts in the courts, in Congress, in the state legislatures, and in the bureaus and agencies
of the Interior Department. Utahns were some of the most adamant supporters and
played a foremost role in all these activities—what Norman Glaser called a “steady
support . . . on the front line with Nevada.”1 But the Rebellion also had mixed support,
for some state officials approached the idea of a transfer with considerable caution. This
chapter first addresses the mounting frustration many westerners felt between 1976 and
1979, and the balance is dedicated to the response of Utah state leaders and politicians in
the first year of rebellion.
1
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Many westerners felt powerless in combating what they considered to be a
suffocating presence. Feeling that the federal government did not respond to local and
state concerns, and frustrated by what seemed to be a bureaucratic excess and
inefficiency, many westerners perceived the federal government to be an oppressive
landlord. Some balked at what they considered to be an unnecessary requirement of the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) for an environmental impact statement (EIS)
for major federal actions on the land. Congressional legislation, such as the Wild Horse
and Burros Act of 1978 (a revision of earlier acts passed in 1959 and 1971), which aimed
to protect these animals from cruel treatment, also provoked the ire of many westerners.
Most important in terms of sparking the Sagebrush Rebellion, of course, was the passage
of FLPMA. It has been said that many westerners were responsible for drafting this piece
of legislation; James Santini, a leading rebel from Nevada, for example, had been a
member of the House Interior Committee that drafted the bill and actually voted for it.
But many other westerners would later complain that they did not know anything about it
until it was too late.
In the immediate years following passage of FLPMA, the Interior Department
began to take steps to implement its mandates. Beginning in 1978 the Bureau of Land
Management commenced the wilderness review process and the Interior Department
announced its policy on water on public lands. The federal government increased grazing
and mining restrictions and regulations as mandated by the BLM Organic Act and the
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Land Surface Management Act. Within three years of its passage, in 1979, agencies had
put into effect much of what was required.2
Many westerners considered the monumental changes in public land policy to be
an extension of the philosophy of the Jimmy Carter administration. Before, most
personnel had been trained in western colleges and came from the rural West with ties to
the grazing and mining interests. But not only did the Carter administration transport
easterners to work as land managers in the West, it also appointed leading
environmentalists to various positions in the administration. The national director of the
BLM, Frank Gregg, was one who came from a strong environmentalist background,
reflected in his stanch opposition to the idea of a transfer. The administration particularly
aroused the ire of many westerners when the President proposed to do away with the
1872 mining law and to withdraw funding for eighteen reclamation projects planned
throughout the country—eight of which were located in the West. Carter eventually
caved to public pressure and rescinded these proposals, yet the episode confirmed in the
minds of many westerners that the Carter administration and the federal government
generally demonstrated a disturbing passivity in addressing the economic needs of the
West.3
Even the federal projects planned by the Carter administration would not have
been salutary. In the late 1970s proposals were made to construct in the deserts of the
Great Basin an elaborate missile system. These MX missiles would rotate on a series of
tracks and be stored in underground bunkers to avoid detection from the Soviet Union.
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The price tag for this project was estimated to be between $33 and $100 million, and the
West certainly would have seen a sizable percentage of that. But there was little real
indication that westerners fully supported the plan. In September 1981 a poll found that
58 percent of residents in eight western states opposed the construction of this military
complex. The wide-open spaces on the federal lands had frequently been targeted as a
prime location for toxic or nuclear waste, and by the 1970s the full consequences of
nuclear testing on “fallout” victims were beginning to be realized. Among other things,
which included environmental and moral ramifications, the MX project pointed to an
enlarged federal presence in the West.4
Few issues fueled rebellion as much as the question of wilderness designation. In
1978 Congress added the most acreage to the National Wilderness Preservation System
that had ever been appended—4.5 million acres. That year the Forest Service was in the
process of its second Roadless Area Review and Evaluation (RARE II), and the BLM,
too, began the process of inventorying its lands for wilderness consideration. But with
considerably more land area to catalog than the Forest Service, the task was lengthy and
involved several stages. The land was to be selected based on its “wild character,”
fulfilling all the requirements of size, naturalness, and quality of experience.
Environmentalists feared that large tracts of land would be eliminated early from the
inventories and that the lands that did make the cut would be relatively small. One
estimate in 1979 was that of 175 million acres inventoried only 6 or 7 million would end
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up as wilderness. But opponents—which made up a sizable contingent in Utah and the
West—protested the “locking up” of any amount of land for wilderness designation.5
About 130 roadless areas in the state’s national forests were studied for possible
wilderness designation, and all but two were said to have been opposed by some of
Utah’s elected officials. At a meeting held in August 1978, commissioners from 22
counties voted to oppose further wilderness designation. Many also contested wilderness
on BLM lands and complained specifically that the BLM had not made efforts to
coordinate activity with the local governments on the matter of wilderness or any other
land-use issue.6
Compounding the problem of wilderness designation was the location of Utah
state lands. The four sections per township allotted to the state were arranged in a grid or
checkerboard-like pattern throughout the state—most of it in “five thousand isolated sixhundred-forty-acre (one square mile) sections surrounded by public lands.” The scattered
location of these lands made access and resource extraction difficult, if not impossible. A
petition dating back to 1976 prompted the Interior Secretary in December 1980 to close
down the Alton coalfield in Kane County on a state parcel from surface mining because it
would adversely affect nearby Bryce Canyon National Park.7 Another conflict related to
the ongoing difficulties with access to state lands. In May 1978, Cleon B. Feight,
5
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Director of the Utah State Department of Natural Resources, requested the BLM to grant
Palmer Oil and Gas Company of Billings, Montana, right-of-way into some state land in
Grand County bordering the Colorado line. A road into the township from the Utah side
had proved environmentally infeasible, but the company had been barred from
constructing a road into the township from the Colorado side. Reportedly the oil and gas
company had failed to make a formal application for road access from Colorado.
Furthermore, access was supposedly denied because Colorado’s Prairie Canyon Area was
earmarked for wilderness review and was to remain roadless until a decision was made.
The director of the BLM in Colorado established his position: “It is our intent to allow no
change in the natural character of this area until the study can be made.” Now Feight
warned that failure to grant the right-of-way would amount to “taking of state property
without due process of law” and “a nullification of an Act of Congress.”
Robert B. Hansen, Utah’s attorney general, relayed this situation to the U.S.
Solicitor General, Attorney General, and Secretary of the Interior. He noted that the
“checkerboard” system of state lands—Sections 2, 16, 32, and 36 in each township—
worsened access and made mineral extraction difficult. FLPMA compounded this
problem since it demanded that areas under consideration remain roadless until a decision
had been reached. “Utah is beginning to encounter a difficult and perplexing problem in
leasing, developing and otherwise utilizing state lands received under school land grants
from the United States,” Hansen wrote.8
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Federal administration of the public lands, wilderness, state lands, and especially
the passage of FLPMA pointed to the gross inequities of federal land ownership and
prompted some westerners to take action. Conflict perhaps inevitable, a handful of
Nevada legislatures began to devise a strategy to pursue recourse through the courts and
in the national and state legislatures. Sometime in 1977, the Nevada legislature
appointed a commission to investigate the issue of gaining more control of public lands,
with a first recommendation for the state’s attorney general to pursue litigation. That
same year the attorney general’s office filed a report detailing the legal possibilities of
claiming public lands by filing in court based on the doctrine of “equal footing,” a
notable element of states’ equal rights. The report addressed the legal basis of equal
footing and its observance by Congress and application by the Supreme Court. Equal
footing usually referred to political matters, but it also embraced areas of property,
specifically the ownership of beds of navigable waters. Because so much land in Nevada
was public and because a little-known statute enacted by Congress in 1972 (28 U.S.C.
2409a) provided for the means to file a claim against the United States, the office
predicted a good chance of success.9
Second, the commission recommended organizing a select committee, which was
soon formed, composed of three senators and three assemblymen. In May 1977, and
again in the following year, its members traveled to Washington D.C., where they
publicized their views and met with various public lands subcommittees, members of
Tribune, May 26, 1979; Joseph Bauman, “State, U.S. go to court over wilderness access,” Deseret News,
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9
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Congress, and officials in the Interior Department. Nevada Senator Richard E.
Blakemore was among this group, convinced thereafter that “the West had to organize,
that it had to be most active in helping to shape regulations under the Organic Act
[FLPMA] and that it had to be active in explaining the public lands situation to
nonwesterners.” The committee used its resources to do just that. In 1978 it helped to
form the Western Coalition on Public Lands, a loosely organized group governed by a
16-member board of directors. The organization also took the lead in developing several
pieces of legislation related to land management, and they worked closely with other
western states to develop a strategic plan of attack. Thus, the select committee would
play a key role in developing and perpetuating the movement that played itself out so
dramatically in the West.10
Some Utahns monitored closely these developments and welcomed them warmly.
On a state level, however, Utah lagged behind in exerting influence in public land use
policy. State officials had yet to establish a State Land Use Commission and to develop a
coherent state policy toward wilderness designation.11 In 1974 the state legislature did
pass a resolution calling for the transfer of all BLM lands to the state, but nothing came
of it. In 1978 Jake Garn was one of two western senators to introduce land legislation in
the U.S. Senate. His was designed to transfer much of the public lands to the western
states, except national parks and forests, and “to serve as an educational tool” for other
politicians in the eastern United States.12 Utahns and other westerners, however, did not
10
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need a similar lesson in the evils of federal ownership of the public lands. A growing
anti-government sentiment was evidenced in various ways, as when during a special
session some Utah state legislators were seen wearing insignias that read: “Welcome to
the West: Property, U.S. Government.”13
By 1979 the idea of a transfer enjoyed a wide backing among Utah state officials,
from state legislators to the attorney general to the director of the Division of State Lands.
Governor Scott M. Matheson was also an early supporter, but, like most other western
governors, he approached this issue with considerable caution. In 1976 he toyed with the
idea of making public lands a foremost campaign issue for the governorship, but he opted
out since he did not want to make any major changes in his platform. A lawyer,
Matheson had family roots in the rural community of Parowan and was certainly aware of
the controversies swirling around public land issues. From the beginning he recognized
the problems of state ownership of public lands, but he was also an ardent proponent of
greater state control of land and resources within its boundaries. So as governor of Utah,
he took a keen interest in the developments of the Sagebrush Rebellion, first taking it
upon himself to evaluate the validity of the legal claim to the public lands and to decide
how involved his state would get involved.14
On the question of court litigation, by 1979 the Nevada legislature had made some
headway by appropriating the necessary funds and by filing two test cases in court. The
first of these cases challenged the Desert Lands Act. The other suit was filed in a U.S.
District Court and aimed to overturn a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court that, in
13
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response to the Wild Horses and Burros Act, stated Congress had the power to act
contrary to state law when it came to the protection of animal life on the public lands.15
Westerners sympathetic to these suits knew the U.S. District Court could not overturn a
Supreme Court decision, but the ruling would increase the chances of like action in the
federal courts and would be helpful should a case ever find its way to the highest court.
But neither case directly addressed the question of state ownership of the public lands;
sagebrush rebels wanted to wait until the right case and the right time to assert legal
authority over the public lands.16
The rebels had two legal theories on which to base this authority: the “equal
footing” doctrine and the “trust theory.” The equal footing claim was tied to an 1845
Supreme Court decision, Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan. This case presented a somewhat
tenuous precedent since the federal government had entered a compact with Georgia
regarding the Alabama, or Yazoo, lands in question, but in western states no similar
compacts existed. Georgia had owned the land that created Alabama; the western states
had been owned by the federal government through treaty, conquest, or purchase.
Another problem was that the doctrine of equal footing was normally interpreted in terms
of property rights as it applied to areas of navigable waters, not the unappropriated public
domain.17 The trust theory, on the other hand, was the notion that the federal government
held the public lands in “trust” for the states and was duty-bound to dispose of them.
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Some believed that the trust theory argument was the stronger of the two, but both had
their problems.18
In 1978 Governor Matheson’s solicitor attorney general, Michael Deamer,
predicted that Nevada would fail in its suit because “there does not appear to be a viable,
legal basis for such action.” He cited the Property Clause as evidence: “Congress shall
have the power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the
territory or other property belonging to the United States.” Moreover, the equal footing
doctrine never did apply to unappropriated lands. Thus, he suggested that a “rifle-shot”
as opposed to a “shotgun” approach would achieve better results—that is, to pursue
specific issues in court in piecemeal fashion.
Utah’s governor decided to send these recommendations to Jones, Waldo,
Holbrook & McDonough, a major Utah law firm. Earlier, in 1976, this firm had drafted a
report regarding the constitutionality of state ownership of the public domain. From this
report, Utah Attorney General Robert Hansen and the Western Attorney Generals’
Litigation Action Committee determined that the equal footing argument did not have
much of a chance to succeed. But by 1978 state officials began to change their minds. In
response to the governor’s inquiry, Donald Holbrook fundamentally disagreed with the
solicitor attorney general and suggested efforts be made “to gain greater state control
over federal lands in the West as opposed to title to those lands.” Arguing that the
absence of legal recourse would consign the western states as “second-class sovereigns of
the Union,” he urged the governor to get involved in the Nevada suits and “to lend the
state’s [Utah’s] name and prestige to this undertaking.” Around this same time, Utah’s
assistant attorneys general, Richard Dewsnup and Dallin Jensen, began to study the
18
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matter. Dewsnup suggested that the western states “join in an action to test whether they
really have any meaningful ‘equal footing’ with the Original States.”19
Thus, skeptical yet hopeful, Governor Matheson told Nevada Governor Robert
List that Utah would be willing to provide financial aid when a suit was entered, “either
in a party plaintiff or in an amicus capacity.” “I am confident that all public land states
would be willing to contribute financial or legal resources to defray the costs of the
litigation,” he penned in a letter dated August 9, 1979.20 But little progress was made in
this area, since the western states bided their time until the right opportunity arose to
pursue litigation. There was also the question of the states having the legal grounds to
sue the federal government without its consent. The federal government said it would not
refuse to entertain a suit by exercising sovereign immunity. Instead, it tried to pressure
the state of Nevada to argue the question of public lands in an existing suit—such as the
suit against the Wild Horses Act—and not to wait until a more favorable opportunity
came their way. But sagebrush rebels had no intention of proceeding quickly; “There is
no great hurry,” Andy Grose of Nevada said. “When you’ve waited 116 years [since
Nevada became a state in 1864], you can wait one more.”21
As legal action stalled, sagebrush rebels took their cause to the legislative halls.
A momentous occasion occurred on February 16, 1979, when the Nevada legislature
passed S.B. 240 (Assembly Bill 413) which asserted state ownership of most of the
state’s federal lands. Governor Robert List signed his name to the bill the following
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June. Effective July 1, this legislation was warmly received among some westerners,
including Utah politicians and others.22
Before other western states had the chance to consider like legislation, sagebrush
rebels took their movement national through one of their darlings, Utah Senator Orrin
Hatch. Born in Pittsburg in 1934, Hatch received his law degree in 1962 before
practicing law in Pennsylvania and Utah. In 1976 he challenged Democratic incumbent
Frank Moss for the Senate seat and won. Variously dubbed “Mr. Free Enterprise” or
“Mr. Constitution,” Hatch quickly developed a reputation for fighting the federal
establishment and its regulations.23 A reflection of this philosophy was his own
sagebrush bill, S. 1680 or The Western Lands Distribution and Regional Equalization Act
of 1979, which he introduced on August 3. In it he called for the “return” and “rightful
title” of certain unappropriated public lands and national forest lands to states west of the
hundredth meridian. To facilitate a clean transfer, the bill provided for the creation of a
seven-man Federal Land Transfer Board; only those states that filed an application for the
transfer and agreed to manage the lands based on the principles of multiple-use would be
considered. Western states that applied would need to organize state land commissions to
oversee the management of the lands. For the federal employees who would be affected
by the transfer, the bill provided for their relocation or reemployment.24
Other pieces of national legislation soon followed. James Santini, a Democrat
from Nevada, introduced a similar bill in the House of Representatives. Also from
22
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Nevada, Senator Paul Laxalt launched S. 739, which would give “landowners more
choice in deciding where to file a civil action”; two others were introduced in the House,
HR 463 and HR 2764, requiring the government to pay the states the equivalent of what
they would have received in taxes had the states owned the land.25 But S. 1680 was the
first, made the biggest headlines, and generated the most determined opposition. Hatch
insisted, contrary to the claims of many, that his bill was not a carbon copy of earlier
proposed legislation, like that introduced in the 1940s. His facilitated an orderly transfer;
it would not force western states to accept ownership of the public lands; it would not
affect the lands already designated for recreational and environmental purposes.26
Not surprisingly, Hatch promoted his bill hard in speeches, monthly reports, and
frequent press releases. He noted on several occasions that the riches of the West, the
abundance of natural resources, were being unduly locked away by easterners who had
never seen the West and by a heavy-handed federal government intent on maintaining
colonial control over the region. A transfer, it seemed, would remedy the problems and
facilitate greater development and use of natural resources in the West. On one occasion
he succinctly noted that the bill “is designed to return control of our destiny to the people
of Utah by transfering title to the unappropriated public lands to the state capital, and,
from there, to the county authorities and, ultimately, the private citizens.”27
Hatch declared that the issue was one not so much of constitutional right as it was
a question of who best would manage the land. In his press releases and interviews, he
25

Jacqueline Vaughn Switzer, Green Backlash: The History and Politics of Environmental
Opposition in the U.S. (Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1997), 182.
26
Sen. Orrin Hatch, “State Management of the Western Public Lands,” speech presented to Utah
Soil Conservation Officials, November 9, 1979, Salt Lake City, transcript in box 15, folder 9, SMMP.
27
Hatch, Congressional Record; Hatch speech, “The Sagebrush Rebellion Is No Brushfire,” box
1, folder 13, PSBR, 4; Hatch, “‘Sagebrush Rebellion’ is no measly brush fire,” Deseret News, September
26, 1979.

40

cited several instances in which federal bureaucrats allowed “millions of trees to be
destroyed by pests.” He argued that western states had the resources necessary to
manage the public lands and that “local people, whose lives and livelihoods are directly
tied to effective land management, will do an even better job than has been done in the
past.” University personnel and ranchers, most with degrees in land management, would
manage the lands. Locals would be even more concerned about protecting the lands for
future use: “Who is a more responsible manager of land resources than the man like our
cattleman or sheep man who must earn his very livelihood from the land he works?” In
editorials and newsletters the senator also pointed out that states had a long history of
responsible management. State management of wild deer herds began in 1907, while the
federal government did not begin to regulate grazing until 1937, he claimed. On this last
point Hatch was wrong, of course, since the Forest Service began managing grazing lands
in 1897.
To Hatch, state ownership of the land also made economic sense. It would
expand the Utah tax base from its rich supply of natural resources, such as coal and iron.
That meant a higher standard of living through development and privatization of the land.
His argument was that the lands would ensure “maximum benefits” to Utahns all the
while satisfying “essential human needs.” State ownership of the public lands, he
predicted, would result in an “economic boom [in the West] . . . greater even than the
many Gold Rushes.”28
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By late summer the issue of public lands in the West was explosive. Public
luminaries such as Dennis DeConcini and Barry Goldwater of Arizona, Alan Simpson
and Malcolm Wallop of Wyoming, and Paul Laxalt and Howard Cannon of Nevada
endorsed Hatch’s bill from its inception and campaigned actively throughout the West to
gain title to the public lands. Significant in terms of public exposure was a three-day
conference of Nevada’s Select Committee on Public Lands in Reno on September 5–7.
In attendance were representatives from ten western states and from rural and urban
counties in Utah—including county commissioners, state legislators, and the attorney
general—many proudly displaying lapels and bumper stickers that read, “Another
Sagebrush REBEL” and “I am proud to be a ‘rebel.’”
A moderate voice at the conference was found in Frank Gregg, the national BLM
director, who had been invited to present his views. He promised conference goers that
his land agency would try to be more responsive to local needs, but he made it clear that
he in no way supported a transfer. But the general feeling of the conference was not one
of cooperation. Speakers sharply criticized the federal management and the
environmental interests it served. As the keynote speaker, Orrin Hatch appealed to a
patriotic impulse by calling for a “second American Revolution”: the government’s
“disdain for private property rights and just plain decency has not been equalled since the
first American Revolution threw out the archetype of such oppression, pompous George
the Third.” He denounced federal controls and regulations on the land and claimed that
the West’s precious resources were subjected to the “whims and vagaries” of federal
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employees. He also attacked environmentalists, whom he labeled as “dandelion pickers”
and a “cult of toadstool worshippers.”29
This summit conference proved significant for a number of reasons. For one,
conference-goers endorsed several key resolutions, such as support for Hatch’s bill, the
creation of the Western Coalition Clearinghouse to collect relevant information, and a
petition to Congress to waive immunity for 5 years so states could file lawsuits.
Additionally, various committees were organized to maintain pressure on both the legal
and legislative fronts. With solidarity and a united purpose, rebels were better equipped
to effectively address the issues and problems confronting their movement. With the
diverse interests that the movement represented, however, unity was not always achieved.
But it was a theme that leading sagebrush rebels continually sounded.30
The conference, together with the proposed national legislation, also propelled the
Sagebrush Rebellion into the national limelight. Articles emerged in national magazines,
as in Newsweek, and in the local news and newspapers across the country—some
embracing the concept of a transfer, others attacking it. The rhetoric of Hatch and others
at the conference exposed some of the more disturbing aspects of the movement, but for
many westerners such rhetoric was simply the truth and illustrated the need to make
much-needed changes in the system. The media attention also highlighted and defined
the issues for the public and delineated more clearly the rebels from their opponents.
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Yet despite the noticeable gains, the passage of S. 1680 was sure to be a long
road, since only about twelve Republicans and three Democrats in Congress supported it.
Rebels were hopeful, nonetheless, that with western and southern support based on the
concept of states’ rights the bill would eventually pass through the Senate. Less certain
was how a majority in the House would support the bill. A Hatch aide, in fact, admitted
that “it’s not quite the climate to get a serious look at the legislation. I doubt we will try
to move it this session,” he said. “It would just be an exercise in futility. But if we have
a harsh winter in the West we may think about moving it next spring.” Still, three
months after introducing the bill, an optimistic Hatch told the Utah Cattlemen’s
Association that he was pleased with the bill’s progress and the public inquiry into the
matter.31
In the meantime, state officials worked to determine a proper course, with
economic considerations topping the list. Only days following the introduction of the
Hatch bill, Governor Matheson determined that a “study of state management capacity
would be necessary.” The next month he commissioned the Utah Agricultural
Experiment Station Personnel at Utah State University for this purpose. The goal was to
determine the economic impact of state ownership of the public lands, not to analyze the
economic impact of transferring the lands to private ownership or to recommend the
course the state should pursue. Still, Matheson would rely heavily on this report and
several times publicly stated that he would not take a position on the question of the
public lands until the report was released. But his willingness to support the Rebellion if
the report turned out positively meant that he did not oppose the Rebellion for aesthetic
31
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or environmental reasons; instead, his was a support contingent on legal and economic
considerations. In Colorado, New Mexico, and Wyoming, too, governors requested a
similar report from their land-grant colleges.32
Before the Utah State study ever reached the governor’s desk, other economic
predictions were cast—mostly critical of a transfer. The Public Lands Institute forecasted
a net deficit of nearly $40 million if national forest and BLM lands were turned over to
the states. Other numbers materialized in the local newspapers. It was said that between
July 1978 and July 1979, the BLM, the Forest Service, and the National Park Service
contributed a total of $94 million into the Utah economy—about $63 million more than
the state could have made had it owned and managed the land. Sagebrush rebels,
however, claimed that since the transfer only applied to BLM lands (Hatch’s bill also
included the national forest land), the state would have lost a mere $9 million. Moreover,
they argued that state management would be much cheaper anyway. Yet while the state
may have been able to manage BLM lands more cheaply and efficiently, the state would
have still lost $12 million from mineral royalties and other fees that it would not have
received otherwise—and millions more from payments in lieu of taxes and federal
highway funds. Besides, opponents feared that “cheap” state management meant poor
environmental protection and the inevitability of the public lands being sold off to private
interests. And as these numbers indicated, a successful transfer likely meant additional
costs for Utah taxpayers.33
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With so many uncertainties of a state takeover, the governor understandably took
a cautious approach to Utah’s own sagebrush bill, pre-filed in December 1979 by Ivan
Matheson, a Republican state senator from Cedar City and chairman of the Public Lands
Committee. The Public Lands Reclamation Act, or S.B. 5, was essentially similar to
Nevada’s bill passed in February 1979. It asserted state ownership of all BLM lands,
which would be turned over to the Division of State Lands and a public land committee
by July 1, 1980. According to Senator Matheson, the state would adhere to the multipleuse concept of land management and take all necessary environmental precautions in
place under the current system. The state legislature would have to grant permission
before any of this land could be sold to private individuals or corporations. One of the
bill’s more controversial provisions would make public enemies of the over four hundred
federal employees; under the bill, BLM officials could be jailed for up to 15 years on a
second degree felony for attempting “to assert jurisdiction over public lands.”34
Early on, the bill enjoyed wide support in the legislature and seemed certain to
pass. The Legislature’s Interim Agricultural Committee endorsed the bill, and two-thirds
of the Senate and the House decided to permit the bill to be debated during the budget
session in January. One of 51 bills that passed the Utah Senate during the budget session,
S.B. 5 sailed through the House 57–11 and the Senate 20–7 and was signed by the
President of the Senate on January 22, 1980. Also, ten days later, on February 2, the
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House passed a Federal Lands Bill Resolution which gave formal support to Hatch’s S.
1680 in the U.S. Senate.35
As for the governor, his office received periodic updates from the USU research
team. One interim report revised some of the numbers that had been cited in the press. It
predicted that the cost to manage the land would be “under 5% of the current state
budget,” or about $35 to $50 million—not an impossible sum. These costs could be
made up, it suggested, by “extracting greater revenues or actually putting selected lands
on tax rolls.” A second interim report was released January 10 with a similar
assessment.36
The favorable indications of the report did not mean that the governor and his
administration did not have their concerns. In December 1979 Jim Butler, a member of
Governor Matheson’s staff, sent a memo to Kent Briggs, the State Planning Coordinator,
suggesting that more information needed to be obtained regarding the public support for
the bill before the governor could take an official position. Later, several days before the
budget session, Butler called together a few members of his staff for a “brainstorming
session” to discuss S.B. 5 and to ascertain the general feeling for the issue. His feeling
was that the bill “will raise as many questions as it answers”; he also felt a “pressing need
for a good analysis of public opinion on this issue.” Members of the governor’s
administration met on January 16 and concluded that the governor could sign the bill if
certain amendments were made to it—i.e., that legislators delete the criminal penalties for
federal managers and the restrictions placed on the governor regarding creation of the
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state public land committee. Matheson also wanted to ensure the transfer applied only to
BLM lands and that the state would manage the land using all the constraints currently in
place. He and other Democrats in the legislature decided to endorse the legislation if
these amendments were added. Besides, according to Matheson in his autobiography,
Out of Balance, his motivation to sign the bill was political since it was an election year,
after all. So the Judiciary Committee inserted the amendments and Matheson signed the
bill on February 14.37
It is interesting to note why the governor and the Utah legislators determined to
support such a bill. It certainly had no bite. It would not mean ranchers and others would
have to go through the state to use the public domain. The bill did call for the transfer to
take place on July 1 of that year, but the federal government would continue to manage
the lands as it had done in Nevada. The bill, then, was a symbolic gesture and a means to
provoke a case in the courts. Utah would piggy-back Nevada on a test case; as the
governor told a gathering two days after signing the bill, “We are taking absolutely no
action until the legal questions are settled.”38
At least the governor’s willingness to sign the bill was in part dependent on the
USU economic report. The final report was not completed by the time S.B. 5 reached the
senate floor, but the governor knew the gist of its conclusions from the interim reports.
USU finally released the full 91-page report, completed through a grant from the Four
Corners Regional Commission, on June 4, 1980. It integrated complex figures to

37

Jim Butler to Kent Briggs, December 12, 1979; Butler to Gov. Matheson, January 4, 1980;
Butler, memo, January 9, 1980; Bulter to Gov. Matheson, January 16, 1980, box 15, folder 10, SMMP;
LaVarr Webb and Joe Costanzo, “‘Sagebrush’ bill sailing along,” Deseret News, January 17, 1980;
Matheson and Key, Out of Balance, 126–27.
38
Bill Heaton, “Matheson Tells Counties’ Officials He’ll OK Sagebrush Rebellion Bill,” Salt Lake
Tribune, February 7, 1980; Matheson speech, February 16, 1980, box 15, folder 6, SMMP.

48

compare economic costs of BLM, Forest Service, and state land agencies, and it gave
high-cost, mid-cost, and low-cost estimates. The range was tremendous. The high-cost
estimate assessed the cost of current management in the BLM and FS, while the low-cost
estimate was based on current state management costs. But the general conclusion of the
report was that a state takeover of federal lands would be economically practical and
potentially profitable. An article in Utah Science authored by USU faculty in the College
of Agriculture and the Department of Economics drew similar conclusions—a state
takeover would be financially feasible.39
The conclusions of this report seemed to legitimatize the Sagebrush Rebellion in
terms of economic feasibility. The report had been well funded by special interests and
the product of academia, and because of its conclusions the governor had decided to back
S.B. 5. One lawyer from Sandy, Utah, wrote: “This pioneering study was accomplished
in a limited time span and under the pressure of intense public interest. In spite of these
adverse circumstances, the USU agricultural economists have produced a model report of
essential economic cost and revenue data.”40
Other critiques of the study were not nearly so positive, finding it seriously flawed
in its analysis and suppositions. An official critique of the report from the state noted that
the analysis of costs and benefits did not take all factors into consideration. According to
this critique the report did not consider the loss of payments in lieu of taxes, increased
fees to ranchers and other users of the public lands, and an increased tax burden “with no
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guarantee of a concurrent federal tax cut due to lesser federal administrative costs.”
Another state critique found the report flawed for similar reasons. It argued that only the
high-cost estimate was legitimate, since the mid- and low-cost estimates would neglect
the “many non-market outputs” related to wildlife, water quality, and recreation. Thus,
these critiques found the report to be “thorough” and “useful,” but generally lacking.41
The simple fact was that no one could accurately predict the economic impact of a
state takeover. The report itself was vigorously analyzed, some lauding it while others
degraded it. Moreover, the question of economics was not the only issue; the claim that
the land belonged to the states also teetered on a shaky legal foundation. Sometime in
December 1979, John Leasy, the associate solicitor of energy and resources, found the
validity of the legal position to be “remote, bordering on non-existent” and predicted that
the courts would not uphold the Nevada Act of June 1979.42 Instead, Attorney General
Robert B. Hansen suggested the western states pursue a number of smaller lawsuits—as
opposed to one large case designed to overturn the constitution—related to in-lieu lands,
access to state and private lands, and water—referred to earlier as the “rifle” approach.
But several of these cases produced frustrating results. In May 1980, the U.S. Supreme
Court reversed a decision of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals related to in-lieu
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selection of Utah lands. Utah would also be involved with several legal battles in the
Supreme Court to gain lake-bed rights to the Great Salt Lake and Utah Lake.43
The legal situation, along with the negative critiques of the USU report, caused
Governor Matheson and other early supporters to be wary of rebellion; the governor, in
fact, was a key player in advocating other means of achieving favorable federal-state
relations, as will be discussed in the fifth chapter. As early as 1979 and 1980 it had
become clear to many that a state takeover of unappropriated federal lands would be an
unlikely endeavor. Neither was the bill introduced by Hatch ever taken seriously by the
House of Representatives and the Senate, which meant the threat of a transfer would be a
non-issue as long as the Supreme Court did not rule in its favor.
No doubt some gains had already been made to soften federal-state relations.
BLM officials made concerted efforts to work hand-in-hand with local westerners.
Federal employees had long been accustomed to holding public hearings, but they
became increasingly attentive to the needs of locals. Early in February 1980, the BLM
held for the first time a workshop designed to address the strengths and weaknesses of
federal land management. National BLM director Frank Gregg and Utah BLM director
Gary Wicks did not support the Rebellion, of course, but they seemed to take it good
naturedly. At the workshop Gregg stated, “To those who want state control of the lands,
I wish them well. The courts will decide it or Congress will decide it. But that’s another
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war. In the meantime, we have lands to manage, so let’s do it cooperatively.”44 In fact,
the Utah Foundation reported in 1980 that, although the movement had yet failed in its
objective to control unappropriated land, it had “generated pressures which have
markedly improved relations between federal land administrators and local land users.”45
The Sagebrush Rebellion was always about regaining local control over land, but
westerners did not always agree on how best to carry this out. Some believed
cooperation was their best recourse; once collaboration among federal and state officials
materialized, as had begun to happen, they believed rebellion had already served its
purpose. Others balked at the notion of cooperation; some, like Senator Hatch, vowed
their best efforts until the ultimate objective had been won—state control and ownership
of the western lands. Though progress seemed slow and stifling at first, even sagebrush
rebels knew that a transfer would be unlikely, or at least would be a long time coming.
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III.
THE RURAL ELEMENT

[The Westerner] became a romantic symbol to people who live in areas of greater rain,
but do not be fooled. He is a tough, tenacious, overworked, and cynical person, with no
more romance to him than the greasewood and alkali in which he labors.
Bernard DeVoto, 1934

[He] who controls the land, controls wealth.
Calvin Black, San Juan County Commissioner

The southeastern region of Utah is a different kind of country from the urban
oasis of the Wasatch Front. The route along Highway 6 from Utah County through
Spanish Fork Canyon is a scenic drive, the mountain landscape not altogether unfamiliar
to those who travel south. But enter Carbon County and continue along Highway 10
through a string of rural settlements in Emery County and familiarity wanes. This is
“Castle Country,” a land of alkali-drenched soils, flora of mostly greasewood and cedar,
and jutted mesas and formations resembling the turrets, which inspired its name. Travel
further south into Grand, Garfield, and San Juan Counties and you encounter more of the
same—a land broken and barren.1
This land has always had profound meaning for those who labor and live on it.
Since their ancestors settled this unlikely country in the 1870s and 1880s, rural Utahns
have pinned their hopes on this land, however harsh and uninviting. But for a people
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who depended on land, it is ironic that it did not all belong to them. Rural Utah was a
shared place, with its land divided among rural people on one side and the federal
government on the other. But some rural people balked at the disproportions; in Garfield
and Grand Counties, for example, the federal government owned as much as 80 or 90
percent of the land. Stockmen and miners in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
worked the public domain how and when they wished with few restrictions on access or
resources. In the twentieth century, however, land users began to feel a tightening of the
leash as they were increasingly forced to go through federal agencies to obtain permits to
graze cattle and sheep or to stake a mining claim. As vast and open as rural Utah was,
there was not enough land to go around, or at least it seemed that way to the ranchers,
miners, and residents who lived on it.
Thus, the Sagebrush Rebellion resonated loudly in rural Utah. As rebellion swept
like brushfire through the West in 1979, 1980, and 1981, embattled ranchers, miners, and
other rural people who felt that the federal government was an insensitive landlord and
that environmental legislation did not serve local interests flocked to its banners. Rural
people rallied around the promise of a land transfer, believing it to be their best chance to
regain control of a place that was no longer theirs. These attitudes and beliefs indicate
that they did not perceive physical space like other people, or “outsiders,” did.2 This
chapter closely reviews these attitudes and the sometimes volatile, and even violent, form
they took during the Sagebrush Rebellion.3
2
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Utah is different from other states in the West because it was settled by Mormons,
or members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Religious devotion drove
these hardy pioneers to establish Christ’s earthly kingdom, even in its most remote
corners. Still today Mormons maintain a majority presence there, and their communities
remain remote and isolated from the urban center. Vestiges of the past and of their
pioneer heritage are everywhere present (in Emery County, residents today boast that not
one single stop light can be found within the county borders), informing in many ways a
sense of place among the region’s inhabitants. Place was a means to connect past to
present, cultural ties to traditional roots. Some sons and grandsons of cattlemen
continued to graze cattle on the public lands partly because it was a means to maintain
familial ties. For others, religious and millenarian thinking informed their attitudes of the
land. One rancher from Emery County, Montell Seely, held the belief that the Second
Coming of Jesus Christ would come before the land’s resources had been exhausted. The
notion was that man had an obligation to better the land and to use its resources for the
good of the human family.4
But it would be a mistake to overstate this way of thinking. Utahns thought about
the land similarly to other peoples in the rural West. However much they held a deep
attachment to the land for cultural, aesthetic, and spiritual reasons, they seemed to have
been driven primarily by material, or economic, interests. In any case, as the story of the
Sagebrush Rebellion illustrates, land continued to be central in rural areas, and rural folks
were willing to go to great lengths to regain control of it.
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In expressing the general feeling and attitude in these rural areas, none was more
articulate than Calvin (or “Cal”) Black, the hard-nosed county commissioner from San
Juan. He was the quintessential environmental antagonist, the inspiration for the
character of Bishop Love in Edward Abbey’s classic novel, The Monkey Wrench Gang—
the kind of man who would “wear bolo ties and shoot doves and eat Vienna sausages out
of a can on fishing jaunts.” In Abbey’s portrayal, the bishop was “patient, methodical
and painstaking” in his efforts to thwart the Monkey Wrench Gang in their plan to
sabotage road construction equipment. Bishop Love was also said to be a man of
considerable business and political acumen who not only held elected office but “owned
the Chevrolet agency in Blanding, several uranium mines . . . and a half interest in the
marina complex at Hall’s crossing.”5 The inspiration was not unfounded: Black had been
mayor of Blanding, a state legislator, and commissioner, and his business ties to the
region included restaurants, gas stations, Lake Powell Concessions, mining interests
(uranium), and more. His was a genuine contempt for “outside” control of land and
resources. In a 1976 bid for the United States Senate, three years before the eruption of
the Rebellion, Black ran on a ticket of reduced government spending, greater local
control of resources, and the proliferation of small businesses. He lost the bid, but that
meant he would remain solidly situated in San Juan, one of the county’s most articulate
and powerful men.6
Black extended his influence over many issues, but in 1979 and 1980 he took up
the Rebellion’s cause with a fury. In the early 1970s, as a member of the Utah legislature
5
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he sponsored a bill that called for a transfer of the public land to the state, but nothing
came of it. His past experience must have taught him that success would only come
slowly, requiring a “gigantic educational process, not only here in the West, but in the
East also,” he reported in an interview. But he was optimistic that people would
gradually warm up to the idea of state ownership of the public domain. To Black, the
Rebellion crossed regional borders in its broad appeal for equality and human rights, and
he hoped easterners would also embrace that promise. And there was precedence for
such a large-scale transfer; if Jimmy Carter had been willing to cede the lease the United
States held on the Panama Canal, as he did in 1977, the same could be done with the
public lands in the West.7
Of all his reasons to support the movement, Black seems to have been most sure
that state ownership of the land would mean effective use of the West’s resources. In an
interview in Logan, Utah, he predicted that in the near future the country would face a
shortage of energy, minerals, food, and other resources. When that time came, the
federal government would “plunder” the West for all it was worth, “because that’s where
the resources are.” Local ownership of the land would fix the problem of
underdevelopment in the present and the rush for western resources in the future. If
anything, rural Utahns were willing to fight to prevent development of the land if
development were to come “faster than we wanted to absorb it.” Rural people wanted to
live in an area where the land was cared for and where the air was clean. “That’s why we
stay here to make a living. But we must make a living,” he said. It disturbed Black that
environmentalists thought that rural Utahns were eager “to rape the land, pollute the sky
and do anything else.” Environmentalists accused him and other rebels of being
7
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motivated by greed and the lure of cheap land and resources, but he denied the
allegations.8
Black took his cause to the public, speaking in political gatherings and private
interviews and publicizing his views in the local and state newspapers. A close review of
the San Juan County Commission minutes reveals he traveled at least several times a
month, often piloting his own airplane to speaking engagements throughout the
Intermountain West. In many ways he was a one-man-show as he represented the
southeastern corner of Utah as an articulate, if somewhat radical, spokesman in favor of a
land swap. But other locals also got involved. Some were active participants in public
meetings and regional conferences. In August 1979, Dell LeFevre, a county
commissioner in Garfield County, traveled to a meeting in Reno, Nevada where the idea
of a transfer of the public lands was discussed. He found it to be the “most exciting” he
had ever attended.9 Some actively participated at the LASER conference held in Salt
Lake City, November 1980.
Rural residents found other ways to make their voices heard, sometimes thanks to
state politicians who sympathized and worked toward a “sagebrush” solution. Senator
Jake Garn conducted a hearing of the Senate Interior Appropriations Subcommittee in
Cedar City in August 1979 to discuss wilderness proposals and the BLM’s proposed
reductions in the number of cattle on the range and grazing permits. In some rural areas
the cutbacks threatened the livelihood of ranchers and cattlemen, with proposed permit
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cuts as high as 75 percent in counties such as Garfield, Washington, Iron, Kane, Beaver,
and Rich. Governor Matheson, who attended the hearings, expressed concern for the
rural rancher and proposed, among other things, that local ranchers ought to play a
greater role in determining the carrying capacity of the land, since they generally had
more experience than federal administrators.10 Senator Garn suggested the BLM suspend
implementation of cutbacks until the appeal process had been completed. Utah
cattlemen, he lamented, would “literally be put out of business,” and families and school
children would be drawn away from the rural communities. This was the fear of the local
ranchers. One cattleman noted, “In ten years you’re going to find the cowboy is an
endangered species.”11
In Garfield County, residents took the initiative to work out their concerns with
the national and state Bureau of Land Management directors, Frank Gregg and Gary
Wicks. These two men made a trip to the county, responding to an invitation from the
Concerned Citizens of Escalante, an anti-environmental group, to give a tour of the
affected range. Local ranchers and concerned citizens turned out in droves, with “three
times the number expected showed up for the field trip.” Locals complained that the
areas shown on the tour had been carefully selected because of their deteriorated state yet
that they hardly were representative of the range land in the county. They insisted the
tour pass through land that had held up well over the years or had been the focus of range
improvements. That evening an emotional and heated public meeting convened in which
ranchers “expressed their frustration and distrust of BLM officials.” Among other things
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they demanded dismissal of Rex Walls, a local BLM field representative, because of his
“insensitivity” toward local concerns.12
Gregg and Wicks seemed to have made every effort to work hand in hand with
the locals on a wide range of issues such as wilderness designation, road access, and
mining regulations. BLM officials met on occasion with county representatives to work
through these disputes; when Cal Black met with the state BLM director to discuss San
Juan County’s Mancos Mesa road and public access to state leased lands, Wicks was said
to have been “responsive to the public wishes.”13 More often than not, however, the
counties resisted the chosen path of the federal agencies on most issues. Road access,
wilderness designation, and mining restrictions were particularly explosive. In April
1980, the San Juan County Commission drafted a letter to the BLM protesting a recent
proposal to restrict mining on public land. It objected to what the commission called
“massive controls and regulations”: increased costs and government restrictions,
inconclusive evidence of environmental degradation, and a threat to the survivability of
the small mine operator. In any case, the commission opposed the implementation of the
restrictions until congressional hearings could be held to debate the issue in public.14
To many rural people, the problem was in the administration of the public land.
BLM employees were seen to have a severe disadvantage in this regard, the perception
being that most came from the East with little practical experience in the West. Their
deficiencies were the result of an “eastern” education that served a “preservationist”
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agenda. State universities, too, were viewed as embracing this philosophy. Locals
denounced university professors for their “ivory tower perch” and elitist attitude, since
environmentalists tended to be “professionals, middle and upper class, with above
average educational levels.”15 One man accused the state universities of “turning out
little robot environmentalists programmed to fight free enterprise and attack the tax
payers who pay for their livelihood.”16 Cal Black called university graduates “deeply
brainwashed” by the educational system.17
In general, federal employees were viewed unkindly in rural Utah for their
ignorance of local culture. Local rancher Ken Summers considered S. Gene Day, district
BLM manager in southeastern Utah, “a public relations man” who “[didn’t] know
anything about cattle.”18 Another rancher complained that people raised in the “suburbs
of Brooklyn” erroneously perceived that Utahns were “raping” and “abusing” the land—
uninformed and prejudiced notions that were commonly held by easterners who became
BLM and Forest Service administrators.19 Thus, ranchers and cattlemen complained that
federal agencies, particularly the BLM, were inconsiderate landlords and out of touch
with local needs. Those running the agency were not elected to their positions, but they
were some of the most powerful men in rural counties where most land is owned by the
federal government.
15
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Consider the feeling of one middle-aged rancher from Hurricane, Washington
County, who had been in the cattle business since he was a boy. In his view, “Uncle Sam
means well but is too far removed” to administer the lands efficiently. “I have personally
spent hundreds of thousands of dollars in the past twenty years to improve the federal
range I use,” he wrote. “I have made a beautiful ranch out of a wilderness that was
almost useless in the beginning when I took it over in 1956.” To him, it was the
westerner who made the land blossom, and it was a travesty that ranchers and cattlemen
never did receive a deed to the barren and desert land they had made productive.20 He,
like other rural Utahns, had a sense of place that valued the accomplishment and effort of
generations before. This notion attributed little significance on the role of “outside”
forces, such as the federal government and eastern institutions, in the making of the West.
In most respects the rural people disliked the eastern mentality and lifestyle. One
rancher from Escalante, Louise Liston, later a commissioner in Garfield County, summed
these feelings up well: “We opened our arms to share the land with them [the
environmentalists], and now they want to take it away from us. People who used to be
nice to them no longer are. When they first started coming down here, it was fine with
everybody. There’s enough wilderness down here for everybody, and we don’t mind
sharing. They don’t share that same attitude. . . . They come down here once or twice a
year and then go back to their city apartments and their nice cars. We stay on the land and
try to make a living.”21 The irony could not have been more clear—the very people who
fought to “conserve” resources disproportionately used more than their share. The
20
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message to outsiders was to stay out: “They ruined their country, now they want to ruin
ours,” one man stated.22
All this meant that rural Utahns had deep and meaningful ties to the land. In
some ways they were the true caretakers of the land, for they chose to live and work on it
full-time. “We are the ones who have true love for our deserts and mountains,” one
rancher from Emery County editorialized. To him, environmentalists were no better than
“drugstore cowboys,” an imitation of the original, “who didn’t know which end of a cow
was the intake and which was the outgo; who didn’t know what a callous was, either on
his pail or on his backside; who had never eaten corral dust.” Theirs was a view of the
land that was not pristine or fragile; they viewed the land as rugged and resilient enough
to have withstood hundreds of years of use. “Pristine” was simply a fancy word
environmentalists used, but to rural Utahns it did not accurately describe the land.
Ranchers and cattlemen understood that the land would only yield so much, but they
believed it would produce a whole lot more than people from the cities fancied. Their
love for the land was both intrinsic and economic, and most recognized the need to keep
it in good condition for future use.23 The best fertilizer for the land, remarked rancher
Hardy Redd, was the “footprint of the owner.”24
Thus, these rural cowboys may have opposed preservation of the land for
preservation’s sake, but they were not anti-nature. Some were fiercely loyal to land that
had been enjoyed for generations for leisure and amusement, and they complained when
22
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outside forces damaged the land or made it inaccessible. Long before hikers and
backpackers from the urban cities found solitude in the San Rafael Swell, known locally
as the “Wedge,” residents of Emery County made annual pilgrimages. Locals called it
“easterin’,” an annual family outing on Easter for a desert picnic and festivities. The
wilderness proposals in that area came under heavy fire in part because that designation
would deprive access to what many locals considered to be the heart of their county.25
The rhetoric and anti-government feeling in these rural counties masked a central
paradox, characterized by the attitude, “get out and give us more money.”26 Cal Black
and his colleagues in the county commission seemed to share this sentiment. In the late
1970s they actively courted a study program of the Department of Energy’s High-Level
Nuclear Waste Repository which would store radioactive waste in the salt deposits of
Gibson Dome. San Juan County was one of nine sites considered, but the commission
had every incentive to fight for the contract: on the line were thousands of new jobs and
as much as a $100 million annual payoff. In editorials and public hearings, as in Moab
and Blanding in July 1980, supporters made their case, while those in opposition rallied
their forces. Black was certain from private conversations that most people favored the
nuclear dump, despite “the negative picture that had been painted regarding Nuclear
Waste Repositories,” he reported in a commission meeting. He was right; the idea was
favorably received in his county, though a little less so among his neighbors to the
north.27
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Yet some San Juan County residents questioned the wisdom of such contracts,
even given the economic benefits to be gained. One man from Montezuma Creek called
it “laughable hypocrisy” that Black would throw his support behind the nuclear waste
proposal, while being the spokesman for a land transfer. “How much more rope do we
give to strangle our pride, independence, and quality of life?” he wrote in frustration. For
those who opposed federal projects on rural land, local control of the land meant Utahns
would not have to worry about the possibility of nuclear waste disposal or large-scale
missile development (i.e. the MX).28 In many ways, a contract in rural counties to dump
nuclear waste did seem out of line given that the Rebellion was all about ridding the
counties of the government altogether. It was about gaining control of land and resource
and generating money for locals and their businesses—not the purse strings of a federal
bureaucracy. It was about ridding once and for all the culture of dependency that many
had become accustomed to.
The pragmatic relationship among rural counties and the federal government is
seemingly contradictory, but in many ways it is to be expected. A government contract
for an energy or reclamation project meant jobs for local communities, and county
officials often actively pursued these contracts. Men like Cal Black knew that the way to
play the game was to fight on multiple fronts. If the idea of a land swap failed, and Black
seemed to sense this reality by early 1981, then at least a lucrative government contract
could pump up the economy. This two-sided thinking, of course, was enough to
convince the other side that the Sagebrush Rebellion was motivated primarily by money
and greed.
the federal government in 1976 alone, which made up more than 30 per cent of the local economy. See
Firmage, A History of Grand County, 365, 369.
28
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However they felt about these projects, most rural Utahns were anti-government,
and during the Rebellion these feelings reached a fevered pitch, rhetorically at least. Cal
Black purportedly threatened a few Bureau of Land Management employees at a
Wilderness study open house on April 12, 1979: “We’ve had enough of you guys telling
us what to do. I’m not a violent man, but I’m getting to the point where I’ll blow up
bridges, [Indian] ruins and vehicles. We’re going to start a revolution. We’re going to
get back our lands. We’re going to sabotage because we’re going to take care of you
BLMers.” The response came, “Mr. Black, I hope you are not threatening me?”; the
reply: “I’m not threatening you, I’m promising you.”29 Not all the rhetoric was as
venomous as this was said to have been, but the feeling it represented seemed to have
pervaded these rural areas. This rhetoric, however rare or infrequent, is one indication of
the animosity felt among rural people and the deep attachment many felt toward the land.
The threats and vandalism could be disturbing and unsettling. In only four years
as BLM district manager, S. Gene Day was said to have faced “lawsuits, bomb threats,
demonstrations and social ostracism.” Well known Utah environmentalist Dick Carter
claimed his life had been threatened by a man in Hanksville, Utah. Sometime in the
summer, 1979, several locals in pick-up trucks had followed a group of environmentalists
on a Bureau of Land Management field trip to their destination. On a 200-foot precipice
overlooking the Dirty Devil River, one burly man allegedly confronted Carter face to face
and said, “In about a minute there’s going to be one less [environmentalist] on this
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planet.”30 There were also willful acts of destruction of archaeological sites, most
notably the defacing of a pictograph panel at the mouth of Courthouse Wash, Grand
County, in April 1979. A reward of $500 was posted for information leading to the arrest
of the perpetrators, but in the end no one was ever apprehended or convicted. Several
cases in San Juan County were taken to the courts, but most were settled without trial.
Cal Black considered such cases harassment, because in his view there was rarely enough
information to convict. As for the defacement at Courthouse Wash, it was believed to be
one manifestation of the brewing animosity between the rural communities and the
federal government.31
The best known display of upheaval occurred in Grand County—the bulldozing
of a road in Negro Bill Canyon, public land that had recently been earmarked for
wilderness study. In a meeting on June 26, 1980, the Grand County Commission and
other county officials publicly declared their intentions to “up-grade” the road that led to
several private mining claims on state land. These county officials assured the public that
the action would be “peaceful in nature” and would only set the county back about $200
to operate the road equipment. They did warn that additional expenses could accrue if
the county was sued, and the commission set aside $10,000 for this purpose, but private
interests had also offered to help cover any legal expenses.32 The date of July 4 was
deliberately selected, a symbolic gesture linking their cause to the venerated celebration
30
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of American independence. Perhaps the timing was intentional for another reason; earlier
in the year the state legislature passed and the governor signed Utah’s own Sagebrush
Rebellion bill (S.B. 5), which called for a state takeover of the public domain on July 1.
This was not the first time Grand County had decided to take its grievances into
its own hands. A year earlier, at the same site, county officials ordered a county grader to
tear down a BLM barricade to the entrance of the canyon, declaring the area property of
the county. It happened more than once, the BLM erecting the barricades and the county
removing them, several times over. The federal government quickly filed suit in
response, demanding a court order prevent the county from removing future barricades
and that an assessment of damages be made.33
This time, a year later, an estimated 250 to 300 people turned out for the event,
congregating as planned in the Moab City Park on a Friday morning. The protesters and
several environmentalists caravanned in 80 four-wheel-drive vehicles and a few cars over
rickety dirt roads about seven miles northeast of Moab up Mill Creek Canyon to the site
formally designated as Roadless Area 139. Brief speeches, mostly from the
commissioners, welcomed the crowd. Harvey Merrell criticized “the cancerous growth
of the bureaucracy,” making an appeal to local control: “We will take control of our
destiny in Southeastern Utah and won’t delegate it to a bureaucracy.” To a cheering
crowd, Larry Jacobs reportedly said, “We have prayed we are doing the right thing, and
33
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at this point I think we are doing the right thing.” On a road formerly used for
seismographic studies, a bulldozer displaying a U.S. flag and flashing a sticker that read
“I’m a Sagebrush Rebel” blazed a dirt trail into federal land. Almost. A few days later S.
Gene Day announced that the bulldozer had failed to enter the WSA boundary. So on
July 7 the county called out a grader to finish the job.34
In his speech that day, July 4, commissioner Ray Tibbetts indicated the action was
not illegal; all roads within the county were to be controlled by the commission, and the
purpose of the bulldozing was to let the BLM know that the road existed. But Tibbetts
and others certainly were not ignorant of the real legal challenges. In a letter to protestorganizer Ron Steele postmarked over a week before the scheduled event, Utah’s
assistant attorney general plainly stated the Attorney General’s office would not become
in any way involved in the protest, nor would it legally defend those involved if a lawsuit
were filed by the United States. He expressed his personal sympathy for the proposed
aims of the Rebellion, but to him the protest was nothing more than “a local reaction to
local frustrations.”35 This is one indication that the rebels did not approach the issues
uniformly, that not all supporters of a land transfer fought on the same front.
In response to the incident, the BLM demanded the Grand County Commission
restore the area, within ten days, as it was “pre-July 4, 1980.” If the commission failed to
comply, then the restoration would be made anyway and Grand County would be charged
34
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with the bill, or the expenses would be deducted from federal funds coming into the
county. Understandably, the commission caved in to the threat of a lawsuit and agreed to
restore the area.36 Public officials in attendance were never charged or prosecuted for
their participation in the illegal act, though there were many people who believed they
should have been.
Of the twenty-nine counties in the state, it is understandable that Grand County
reached such a pitch of agitation. FLPMA was a difficult blow for many ranchers and
miners in the county who had previously roamed the range virtually unfettered. In Grand
County, as in the other counties under the Moab District of the BLM, the roadless areas
under review for wilderness study was the highest percentage in the state.37 But the
extent to which local residents supported such activity is difficult to assess. Some
residents expressed their dissatisfaction with the planned protest in the July 3, 1980, issue
of the local newspaper, the Times–Independent, and a poll of Grand County residents
indicated there were many locals in opposition. Moab was an eclectic community.
Ranchers and miners represent the roots of its settlement, but federal employees and
recreation enthusiasts also comprised a significant portion of the county’s nearly 10,000
residents. One member of the Wilderness Society who observed the proceedings rightly
stated, “I don’t think even townspeople this time are behind this, really. A lot of people
who support the Sagebrush Rebellion don’t support this expression.”38
One man from San Juan County called the federal government simply a “paper
tiger,” hardly the real cause of rural problems. If anything was to blame it was the local
people themselves because they “simply want too much.” This way of thinking coupled
36
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with a booming citizenry in many rural counties meant less resources and land to go
around.39 The point was well made, for growth was a pressing issue for Grand County by
the late 1970s. It seems to have been the justification behind issuing the grazing cutbacks
for 326 ranchers in the four counties in southeastern Utah. District manager Day
believed such restrictions were necessary since these counties had been growing at such a
fast rate: “Like Pogo says: We have met the enemy and he is us,” he said. In his view the
BLM was forced to restrict land use, since the land had been pushed to its limit—with at
least 80 percent of the public range in fair or worse condition.40
On the state level, the reaction to the staged protest was almost collectively one of
outrage. For nearly a month after the fact, letters to the editor in the Deseret News and
the Salt Lake Tribune mocked the public demonstration, one calling it “a sad point of
violence and lawlessness” and another a “childish” act of “a mob of juvenile pseudopatriot-nuts.” Another letter referred to the “myopic decision-making of the rebellion”
and the new level to which proponents were willing to stoop to make their voices heard.
One lamented that tax dollars had been used in the protest and that both the Grand
County Democratic and Republican chairpersons endorsed the activity. To the
opposition, at least, the rebels were sending a clear message to the public by violating
federal law and employing what one reader called “bulldozer diplomacy”: the sagebrush
rebels’ purposes were parochial, intentions self-serving, and cause unreliable.41 These
blanket generalizations were misleading and somewhat unwarranted, of course, for it can
39
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be said only with difficulty that the decision to proceed with the protest was made by
more than a handful of people and supported by a majority of Grand County residents, let
alone all sagebrush rebels.
Elsewhere in southeastern Utah the Rebellion did not reach the heightened form it
took in Grand County. Editorials and letters to the editor regarding the Rebellion were
published in local newspapers, but most rural Utahns did not get involved directly. In
Castle Valley, for instance, local residents do not recall attending public meetings or
forums in which the land transfer had been discussed.42 But for them, as in other areas in
southern and southeastern Utah, the Sagebrush Rebellion came to represent local
frustrations, a catchword that embodied local grievances, even if a transfer of land to the
states was not foremost in their minds. It was about gaining control of their own lives; it
was about retaining a sense of independence and self-reliance that had been a trademark
of their forbearers.
Wallace Stegner has characterized the resentment and anger of rural Utahns as
“an expression of desperation, the frontier dying hard, the reaction of people pushed to
the edge of their tolerance by forces they do not understand.” He went on to suggest rural
Utahns expected too much from the land and were too eager to compromise the quality of
the land for a better living. Stegner evoked the notion of the West as harsh and
unforgiving. A close study of its past would reveal the land’s liability: relentless cycles
of boom and bust, economic depression, and ecological unpredictability.43
Stegner was right: the land was a liability, it was harsh and unforgiving, and it
was unpredictable. A new era in the West had opened in 1976 with the passage of
42
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FLPMA, and cattlemen and miners were to feel the brunt of it. But it would be a mistake
to believe that rural Utahns did not know this, at least in part. For generations they had
been making a living from the land, and some doing it quite well. They intimately knew
the land and how much it would give. Despite the allegations to the contrary, rural
Utahns did not seem determined in their own minds to plunder or milk the land for all it
was worth. Some did stand to gain from a land swap, and the prospects of gaining wealth
must have been attractive to many, but these people knew better than most how much the
land would give. They probably never believed that the land would ever make them
wealthy, but most shared the sentiment expressed by Ray Tibbetts, county commissioner
in Grand County: “There isn’t one inch of worthless land in Utah.”44 Land was always
good for something—grazing, minerals, gas and oil, recreation—and rural folk wanted
control of it.
For some time a feeling of insubordination and resentment had been growing
among ranchers, miners, and other peoples in rural areas. The fiery rhetoric of state and
national rebellion leaders, and of their own Cal Black, added to the animosity. Phrases
such as “second American Revolution,” “radical environmentalism,” and “cult of
toadstool worshippers,” only intensified the anti-federal government sentiments, no doubt
contributing to the protests, vandalism, and threats of violence in rural Utah.45 Unlike in
the metropolitan areas, these feelings were widely felt and rural communities displayed a
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remarkable sense of solidarity in the bid to rid their land of the federal government.
People awarded the kind of efforts made by Cal Black to represent rural interests; in 1980
his community of Blanding designated him as “Citizen of the Year.”46
Rural Utahns found ways to express their feelings, most notably through the
protest on July 4. As much as anything, the bulldozing incident in Grand County may
rightly be seen as a conjoining of the physical and the symbolic. The protest represented
a real, legitimate grievance held by many rural Utahns toward the federal government.
But it was also a way to draw on sacred history and a shared American heritage and to
express Old West/Golden West nostalgia. In this way sagebrush rebels linked their cause
to the American independence and grouped it within the categories of Civil Rights and
the anti-war demonstrations of the 1960s.47 For many Grand County residents, and
probably other rural Utahns, it would not have been contradictory to protest with
bulldozers on the day the nation celebrated independence, or on the very day San Juan
County celebrated the centennial of the arrival of the Hole-in-the-Rock pioneers.
The day of protest, the speeches, the bulldozing—these were ways to express the
significance of land in rural Utah. For rural Utahns land embodied a physical reality, but
it also personified the hopes and aspirations of farmers, miners, and ranchers whose
livelihood was dependent on the land. Neither pristine nor fragile, it was harsh and in
many ways unforgiving, but it could also be productive and potentially profitable. For
generations, land had been an integral aspect of rural economic, social, and cultural life,
and rural sagebrush rebels fought to keep it that way. Cal Black and others continued to
46
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work out differences with the federal employees, of course, and some success was made
to sweeten relationships gone sour.48 But working with the federal government would
not be necessary when the land was theirs, if that day ever came. Joining the rebel cause,
and adding to it a unique brand of activism, was their best chance to at last regain control
of a land that they had shared for too long.

48

For an example, see San Juan County Commission Minutes, July 7, 1980.

75

IV.
THE OPPOSITION

[The Sagebrush Rebellion] has not and can not grow more palatable grass on the range
for more cows and sheep. It does not grow more timber and can’t. It can not produce
more water or cleaner water or better wildlife habitat. It can not provide for more and
better uniform resource studies and much needed inventories of our land resources. It
cannot and has not trained better foresters, range managers or wildlife managers.
Dick Carter, 1980

Given the meaning of land to cattlemen, miners, and other rural Utahns who lived
close to the public lands, it seems natural that they would wholeheartedly embrace the
idea of a transfer of the public domain. The transfer was also supported by people in
urban areas, as we have seen, but these people did not have the connection to land that
rural Utahns had. The vast majority of Utahns did not live next to and work on the land;
most lived along a 120-mile long stretch of continuous settlement running as far south as
Santaquin and as far north as Brigham City. The rise of the urban West in the twentieth
century infused new values into the region, including an environmental ethos that came
out in determined opposition against the notion of a public lands transfer.
Environmentalists, with their own distinctive values and ties to the land, voiced their
viewpoints in articles and editorials, town meetings, and university classrooms.
The vivacity and persistence of the environmental community in their
denunciation of a transfer certainly made an imprint on the dynamics of the land transfer.
On a national scale, environmental groups such as the Sierra Club, National Audubon
Society, and National Wildlife Federation made a concerted effort to oppose the transfer.
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In Utah, this anti-rebellion activity was particularly intense, led by able environmentalists
in such organizations as the Utah Wilderness Association and the Utah Chapter of the
Sierra Club. Concerned citizens, academics, and even sportsmen joined efforts to put out
the brush fire that swept across the desert sod of the West for nearly two years. The net
result was a well coordinated campaign which succeeded in discrediting the rebellion in
the public’s eye and which ultimately led, in part, to the Rebellion’s demise.
Historians have referred to the 1970s as the “environmental decade,” marking the
broad public acceptance and permanence of the new environmental ethos of the post-war
period. Environmental organizations increasingly garnered more members and took on a
number of issues, from wilderness preservation to air quality to wildlife concerns. In
1977 a survey found that 32 percent of the public believed there was not enough land set
apart as wilderness; 62 percent opposed the cutting of more timber.1 Yet of all the areas
of concern, for two years beginning in 1979 the threat of a public land takeover became a
priority. By August 1979, about the same time that Senator Hatch introduced his first
sagebrush bill in the Senate, environmental groups had begun an all-out mobilization.
The Sierra Club, established in 1892 and led by John Muir in a crusade to protect
the Pacific Coast lands, was probably the most established and best known of these
organizations.2 In August 1979, in a form letter addressed to leading environmentalists,
Brant Calkin of the Sierra Club depicted the rising threat of the Sagebrush Rebellion and
outlined a preliminary counterattack. In some ways, the suggested course was ambitious
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and required tremendous energy and resources. The question over the future of public
lands would become a catalyst to encourage membership and a major point of dialogue
among conservation and political leaders, particularly among their “political allies.” The
BLM itself, caught in the crossfire of rebels and environmentalists, became another
target—to expose the “inertia, error, or timidity” of the bureau and its director, Frank
Gregg. All of this was in addition to anti-rebellion articles for Sierra and other outlets
and a draft of a letter for concerned environmentalists who wished to submit opinion
letters to local newspapers. In all these activities Calkin suggested they attack the
credibility of the movement and “to cover it with disrepute.”3
Perhaps most directly, the Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club formed the Sagebrush
Rebellion Committee, which activated numerous activities; members met regularly, set
up booths at various conferences, delivered speeches, and published a newsletter. One
such was published in the spring of 1981, a four-page anti-Rebellion “tabloid” edited by
Michael Budig called The Sagebrush Ripoff. This newsletter included several antirebellion articles and brief statements, some reprints, written by representatives of such
organizations as the National Campers and Hikers Association, Utah Trails Council, and
the Rocky Mountain Federation of Fly Fisherman. The pamphlet had a printing run of
about seven thousand and was distributed locally to “sports and recreation stores,
campuses, and . . . other interested groups and individuals throughout the state.”4
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Other local conservation groups joined in the crusade to counter a proposed
transfer, some with even more vim than the Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club. Leading all
was the Utah Wilderness Association (UWA), established in 1979 and headed by Dick
Carter. Born and raised in Utah, Carter was educated at the College of Natural Resources
at Utah State University and for a time worked as a rancher in the Forest Service before
accepting a staff job in Washington D.C. with the Wilderness Society. Discontented in
D.C., Carter returned to Utah in 1976 to form a branch of the WS in Salt Lake City, only
to see it closed three years later. So he established the UWA. Carter’s ardor and
commitment to preserving wild lands and open spaces made him one of the most
effective and informed spokesman for the anti-rebellion opposition in Utah.5
Carter worked closely with other regional and national leaders of the Wilderness
Society, including Dave Foreman, Bob Langsenkamp, Brant Calkin, Russ Shay, and
Betsy Barnett to formulate a plan of attack. Foreman, the southwest representative of the
Wilderness Society, and Langsenkamp disbursed a memo to “Western Public Land
leaders” in August 1979 expressing apprehension over the recent Rebellion
developments. They announced that a public “gathering” would take place on October
27 and 28 in Denver “to talk, brainstorm, strategize, and come to grips with the
Sagebrush Rebellion” and other public lands concerns. It was also recommended to
organize calling lists and to drop the “romantic” term “Sagebrush Rebellion” for a more
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negative one, such as “Public Lands Rip-Off”—a moniker likely picked by the Sierra
Club for its newsletter.6
Carter’s local Utah Wilderness Association made a name for itself as an ardent
opponent of the proposed transfer. By September, on a tight budget and with a small
staff, the Association had taken the lead on several fronts: newspaper editorials, “big
displays for bookstores and outdoor shops,” information for the public on the public
lands, and radio and television appearances. For television, the Society put together three
separate shows, two airing on commercial television and one on public television. For a
program called Crossfire, Carter appeared with Cal Black before a public audience—“75
of our folks showed up, only 4 of Cal’s,” Carter later wrote to Foreman. It was clear to
national environmentalists like Foreman that the Utah branch under Carter was way
ahead of the other western states in organizing an opposition movement to the threat of a
transfer. Foreman was particularly impressed with the steps taken to distribute material
through the media, and he suggested Carter head that department at the meeting in
Denver.7
The UWA published regular newsletters during this period addressing relevant
public lands issues; at least three volumes were dedicated to exposing the various
“myths” upon which the Sagebrush Rebellion was based. These ranged from the notion
that “states could do it better” to the falsehood that the public lands were run by “faceless
decision makers.” The message of these newsletters, much like those of the Sierra Club,
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was that the movement to transfer the lands was little more than a display of greed.8
Some messages seemed to be directed to members of the community who believed
federal management of the land was restrictive. They claimed that local community
leaders do have a voice in public land management, the land is open to off-road vehicles
(ORV), and lands do not restrict needed community services.9
The newsletter articles were reinforced by a steady stream of letters flooding the
local newspapers and the offices of local and state politicians. These letters were
especially common in the months following the introduction of Hatch’s bill and each
denounced the rebels’ aims and motives in calling for state ownership of the public
lands.10 The most common concern was that the public lands would be sold to private
owners. If a transfer succeeded, one person wrote, little could be done to save “the
Uintahs from summer homes and snowmobiles and the Kaiparowits from becoming a
pawn in California’s greedy energy usage.” Another penned that “GREED is the motive,
not the better land management.” For others, a transfer imperiled needed protection of
animals and plant life. One mused: “our greatest enemy is mankind itself, too often
reckless and precipitate and often inclined to bring about its own self-annihilation.”11
These letters suggested that a transfer would be the undoing of years of environmental
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progress and would threaten a lifestyle that cherished the land for its aesthetic and
spiritual appeal.
Newsletter articles and letters to the editor could be especially critical of state
land management. They accused directors of state lands of having little concern for the
protection and preservation of wildlife and historic artifacts. By law, in fact, the Utah
Division of State Lands (DSL) had the primary charge to maximize income. As a result,
the critics contended, management of state lands in the Intermountain West had left scars
on the landscape—namely, the permitting of strip-mining on state land in Capital Reef
and the “pollution and congestion” in and around Lake Tahoe in Nevada.12
One incident was particularly volatile. Environmentalists blamed the DSL for
damage to about 500 acres and six archeological sites on state land in Mule Canyon in
San Juan County. Some of the artifacts and remnant dwellings of the Mesa Verde
Anasazi were disturbed by chaining, a method used to clear the foliage from an area with
chains tied to two tractors. On November 24, a local rancher, Lisle Adams, with
assistance from the Utah Division of State Land, the State Department of Agriculture,
and the U.S. Soil Conservation Service, had purportedly carried out the act. There had
been no attempt to conduct an archeological survey of the area or, seemingly, to avoid the
historic sites, some of which were clearly marked by blue flags, according to La Mar
Lindsay, the assistant state archeologist. Lindsay noted that tractor prints clearly
indicated what happened and how much damage had been sustained. While most sites
were salvageable, one site showed so much surface damage that “site interpretation may
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not be possible.” In any case, Lindsay suggested that “the agency responsible” absorb the
restoration costs and that the sites be added to the National Register.13
The state archeologist agreed with Lindsay’s analysis and demanded the payment
of reparations after an environmental evaluation be made. He, too, blamed the Division
of State Lands for not taking the necessary steps to “protect cultural resources on state
owned properties.” And he predicted that “cultural resources” would continue to sustain
damages on state lands as long as the DSL did not take necessary precautions. Three
years of attempting to reach an agreement with the state on the part of the Division of
State History came of nothing and he had little reason to believe that any changes would
be made in the near future. In fact, the state had planned 18 other chainings in San Juan
County alone.14
This incident exposed potential consequences of a takeover. Utah had few
resources to manage the land—the two best land agencies were probably the State
Wildlife Commission and the State Parks and Recreation—and even fewer conservation
measures on the books. It had no Wilderness Act, Antiquities Act, Multiple-Use and
Sustained Yield Act, Endangered Species Act, or Natural Areas Act. Without these
safeguards, argued environmentalists, even with a solid track record the state could do
nothing to guarantee the protection of the fragile land. “To allow the state, with its bad
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track record, to control [the public lands] would be a travesty,” one member of the Sierra
Club wrote.15
By attacking the aims of those who supported a transfer and by exposing the
drawbacks of state management, environmentalists seemed to make some real gains early
on. Dick Carter reported in September 1979 that his organization had made “converts” of
the Governor, the State Planning Coordinator’s office, and the State Department of
Agriculture, and that it had “been able to keep Marriott, McKay and Garn from
screaming about the ‘Sagebrush Rebellion.’”16 The silence did not last, however, as
Utah’s congressional delegation and state legislators joined the campaign to pass Senate
Bill 5, Utah’s own rebellion bill.
In response, Carter lambasted the bill. To a gathering at the Kiwanis Club, as in
his other public appearances, Carter characterized the rebels’ rhetoric as little more than a
smokescreen. He assured the audience that a transfer would do little to meet “the
mandates of an ethical, moral and equitable multiple use philosophy.”17 On another
occasion, this time in UWA newsletter, he noted that the bill was not so much a benign
attempt to change land ownership from the feds to the states or to facilitate greater
multiple-use on the public lands but a malignant scheme “to allow rampant unrestricted
development on BLM lands.” Thus, he encouraged concerned citizens to write and
phone local leaders, state representatives, and Governor Matheson to oppose the bill. “If
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we are going to shut this nonsensical Sagebrush Rebellion rhetoric down we must show
we have the strength to do it.”18
Judging by the number of letters written in opposition to S.B. 5, Carter’s letter
must have reached an audience. The governor’s correspondence files contain numerous
letters from concerned citizens with protests ranging from outrage that a non-budget bill
was being considered during a budget session to complaints that no public hearings or
debates had been held regarding the matter. One letter signed by William Vogel—which
stated that the bill was simply “a resolution masquerading as a law, and ought to be
vetoed for reasons of dishonesty and deception”—called for the governor to display
another case of “Matheson courage” by vetoing the bill. Matheson failed in this,
however, and signed the bill anyway, but in a typical response to these letters he stated
that action would only be taken when it was deemed constitutional by the courts to do
so.19 Other forms of protest, as well, pushed to block the bill’s passage. Newsletters
attacked the general and specific aims of a transfer, and local organizations and groups
sponsored anti-rebellion lectures. Among those organizations considered by the Utah
Wilderness Association to deliver the lectures were the Utah Association of 4 Wheel
Drive Clubs, Mountain Men of the Wasatch, League of Women Voters, Boy Scouts, and
Kiwanis Club.20
It was unclear initially whether sportsmen and outdoor clubs would oppose or
support a transfer, but these groups would prove to be some of the most vocal contenders.
National sportsmen such as Richard Starnes and Ted Trueblood and sportsmen’s
18
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publications such as Field & Stream, National Parks & Conservation Magazine, and
Trailer Life criticized the tactics of the rebels and their interests.21 Outdoors Unlimited,
an anti-wilderness organization based on motorized recreation, was alleged to have sided
with the rebels (and happened to be led by a leading rebel, John Harmer), but this
sentiment was not widely shared by other sportsmen and recreation clubs. Utah Guides
and Outfitters, Utah Trails Council, and the Utah Wildlife and Outdoor Recreation
Federation each issued public statements expressing distrust of a transfer, and the
American Hiking Society urged its members to write to congressmen to vote against the
land swap.22 The common theme in these statements was fear that state or private
ownership would restrict access to sportsmen and outdoor enthusiasts. In this sense they
opposed a transfer, but these groups did not consistently side with the environmentalists
on every issue. Membership in these organizations was an eclectic mix of outdoorsmen,
hunters, hikers, and other outdoor enthusiasts who may or may not have favored
“environmental” measures. These same individuals may have resisted wilderness
designations because of the restrictions they imposed, but when it came to putting the
public lands in peril of private ownership they allied themselves with the
environmentalists.
One sportsman, Jan Brunvand, asserted that the proposal to transfer the land
would only serve the interests of the wealthy who could afford to recreate on private
lands. A similar phenomenon had already occurred on his favorite strip of the Weber
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River. As a fly fishermen, he had formerly had access to it for a small fee, but it now
cost “about 35 times” the original price of $25 per season since the United Sportsmen, a
national company, began leasing it in 1980. Whereas there had once been a “fine
cooperative relationship between the rancher-businessman and local sportsman,” that had
changed with the new ownership and higher fees. This was a common complaint—
sportsmen and recreation enthusiasts were apprehensive that public lands would be
overrun by “outside” interests. Whereas rebels spoke of federal bureaucracies as
“outsiders,” sportsmen and environmentalists considered outsiders to be “investors,
country-clubbers, and wealthy Californians.”23
The strength of the opposition, even with the support of these groups, was not
enough to prevent the state legislature from passing the bill and the governor from
signing it. A year later, with several pre-filed bills pending in the state House of
Representatives, Carter once more spearheaded efforts to shut them down. This time he
was even more prepared for the brawl. By early January 1981, when the Utah Senate
convened in session, UWA had pre-determined the stance of each senator and had
distributed materials to several key Senators and House members. Desperate for
community activists to step up participation in the anti-Rebellion efforts because “we
simply are dealing with too many issues,” Carter wrote to twenty activists and invited
them to a strategy meeting on January 13. He hoped to make specific assignments to
“know exactly what is happening to any SBR legislation” and to “work the phones and
organize your key friends and neighbors.”24
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One sore spot requiring a counter-offense was the USU economic report that
prompted the governor to sign S.B. 5 in the first place. The UWA newsletter insisted that
the report fallaciously assumed that the worth of minerals underground was unlimited and
that “environmental regulations are causing our economic problems today and those
regulations cause more harm than good.” Another group pointed out that the authors of
the report were not qualified to produce “interpretive history”; the historical section of
the report was littered with inaccuracies and the frequent use of historical quotations
taken out of context. In its economic analysis, too, the report did not correctly address
the costs and benefits of a state takeover of lands and the additional costs that would be
shouldered by Utah citizens.25
Interesting to note is that this “official” report was produced by academics trained
in resource management. USU produced a sizable number of federal employees working
for the BLM and the Forest Service, but academics at the university were mostly
restrained in expressing any sort of distrust in the idea of a transfer. There was one
notable exception, however, in Bernard Shanks—a professor of public land policy in the
College of Natural Resources. Shanks grew up in the mid-West, but once introduced to
the West he became a real outdoors enthusiast, working for a time as a ranger and
manager on the public lands. At USU he described his job as “the public policy aspects
of land management”; through experience and temperament, he was a staunch defender
of the public lands and of the university who trained a sizable number of BLM
employees. He saw himself as a sole advocate of professional training against the
vituperative attacks made by the rebels—attacks which Shanks said paralyzed the
25

For details see, “‘The Sagebrush Rebellion’ Volume Three, newsletter of the Utah Wilderness
Association, box 1, folder 3, AUWA; Juline Christofferson to Gov. Matheson, May 1, 1981, box 15, folder
15, SMMP.

88

academic community. Initially Shanks taught small seminars at USU where he spoke out
against the absurdity of the so-called Sagebrush Rebellion. Soon he was speaking to
larger gatherings, delivering the same address more than a couple dozen times within a
few months. “It was my first experience with a little notoriety,” he later recalled.26
In his typical speeches, Shanks normally provided a brief overview of the history
of the public land and mentioned the fallacies in the argument in favor of a land swap.
His attacks could be personal and inflated in his denunciation of the “myths” that drove
the Sagebrush Rebellion. These myths included the fallacious claims that states would be
more efficient and more responsible in their care of the land, that states had at one time
won or owned the public lands, and that the West was a colony of Uncle Sam. He
asserted that the movement was motivated by greed, private interests, and big business,
not the patriotic impulse of a “second American Revolution.” “If Thomas Jefferson
could speak to us today, he would likely be insulted that this movement has been called a
‘rebellion.’ There is little revolutionary about greed, he would likely say,” Shanks
informed members of a public rally in freezing temperatures in Boise, Idaho, in early
1981.27
Shanks aptly drew comparisons between the Rebellion and issues that provoked
an emotional response. He feared that land bought up by private interests would signal
the return to the “environmental Dark Ages” by setting back the clock to a time when
ranchers and miners had free range on the land. He feared miners and large-scale
developers would extract precious resources from land that was once considered barren
26
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and worthless. To Shanks, a loss of the public land would result in moral and spiritual
decline, for the Rebellion dipped into larger matters such as materialism and “wealth,
power and freedom.” In the spirit of Frederick Jackson Turner, and alongside other
environmentalists, Shanks attributed national significance to the western lands. Public
land was one of the nation’s most valuable resources, which must remain protected for
the “common good” of all Americans.28
Most volatile and controversial was Shanks’ accusation that the Rebellion was
“the New McCarthyism,” a theme he sounded in more than a few public appearances. He
delineated that the historical connection was unmistakable: each movement “gained
momentum rapidly with the use of fear and distortion”; each fueled on the notion of
“false patriotism”; each displayed contempt for a specific group of people; each relied on
certain rhetorical techniques. Shanks denounced the “insults, distortions, and half-truths”
flung by political leaders at BLM and Forest Service employees who had no power to
respond. Like the “Red Scare” in the 1950s, the Sagebrush Rebellion relied on scaretactics to silence the opposition. It was for this reason, he maintained, that many
politicians, members of the media, and academics were either unwilling or too
intimidated to challenge the rebels’ claims.29
Of course, Shanks’ rhetoric was just as inflammatory and divisive as what he
accused of the rebels. He insinuated that rebels supported their claims with a “thin tissue
28
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of lies” and that “every ‘rebel’ leader was tied to public-land exploitation.”30 He also
suggested that however much land fraud, corruption, and speculation occurred in the
history of the West, no land grab was more potentially damaging than this one.31 Shanks
purposefully linked the rebel cause to development and resource exploitation and state
ownership of the public lands as a means to this end. His rhetoric and the noise it
generated, though, would ultimately affect him in a personal way.
In the spring of 1980, Cal Black and Ray Tibbetts reportedly generated a letter of
complaint against Shanks addressed to the president of Utah State University. Ostensibly
signed by the Utah Woolgrowers Association, the Cattlemen’s Association, and the Farm
Bureau, the letter referred to a USU news release written by John Flannery which had
quoted Shanks as stating that the rebels were out to “plunder the West.” The letter
complained that tax dollars must have been used to make the news release. It declared
that donors to the university were likely to take offense and specifically implied that
pending donations would be withheld for a new five-million-dollar natural resources
building scheduled for construction unless the situation was taken care of. The letter
outlined a clear solution: fire Shanks.32
This letter was probably the primary catalyst behind why the university did let
Shanks go sometime in 1980. Perhaps this was inevitable at a university where one hand
received money in federal grants and the other was sustained by tax dollars appropriated
by the state legislature. But in any case, Shanks confronted opposition from his
30
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colleagues to his approach to the question of the public lands, most significantly from
Doyle F. Matthews, dean of the College of Agriculture. If Shanks had confined his views
to the classroom and not ventured into the public arena, he undoubtedly would have kept
his job in Logan. But the university decided to dismiss him on the grounds that he had
failed to make tenure; Shanks insisted it was because of his active involvement in the
Sagebrush Rebellion. Whatever the reason, he continued to speak out, but it is clear that
feelings became even more personal. On one occasion he stated: “A person can only
wonder about a ‘rebellion’ which attempts to deny a person freedom of speech and which
has apparently succeeded with intimidating the faculty most concerned with conservation
and public land management.” He later stated that this episode confirmed in his own
mind the validity of the McCarthy parallel.33
After 1981 when the movement for a transfer died down, environmental
organizations and those made up the opposition grappled with a new set of challenges
quite apart from the question of a transfer. These challenges will become clear in the
subsequent chapter. But the pressure on environmentalism serendipitously marked an
upturn in environmental concern and participation. The Sagebrush Rebellion may not
have been the cause of an explosion of environmental activism in the 1980s; James
Watt’s “good neighbor” policies and Reagan’s privatization, which will be discussed in
the next chapter, did that. But the publicity and the radicalism of the sagebrush rebel’s
claims to the land convinced some people of the need to actively work to protect the
environment. Environmental organizations began more sophisticated methods of
coordination and increased fundraising and lobbying. The changing dynamics of
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environmental participation also affected divisions within the environmental community
into moderate, mainstream environmentalism and radical environmentalism. According
to Dave Foreman, cofounder and spokesman for the radical Earth First!, it was the events
of the Sagebrush Rebellion, and especially the July 4 bulldozing incident in Moab, that
propelled him and others to take a more radical stance and to “avoid the pitfalls of cooption and moderation which we had already experienced.” In 1979 Foreman had been
an key player in lobbying and rationally discussing environmental issues, as was earlier
discussed in this chapter; by March 1981, with the official initiation of Earth First!, he
stood atop of the Glen Canyon Dam in a radical protest of its existence.34
Although the Sagebrush Rebellion contributed to the larger environmental trends,
the anti-rebellion movement in Utah was not grassroots oriented. Most active
participants were local citizens who were affiliated with local chapters of national
environmental organizations, and most tended to be white and middle-class, which
followed national trends. But the anti-rebellion forces did not reflect the local grassroots
environmentalism that focused not so much on the environment as on public health
issues.35 The Sagebrush Rebellion posed little threat to the public health or safety in the
form of environmental hazards like nuclear testing, toxic waste, or pollution. Rather,
opponents of the idea of a transfer expressed traditional conservationist concerns over the
aesthetic value of open space or the preservation of wild areas. This is what rallied
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conservationists in the early days and what continued to bring environmentalists together
in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
This does not mean that local citizens did not get involved and, in some cases,
aggressively voice their opinions about the idea of a transfer. Some mounted a strong
offensive posture by writing letters to the editor of local newspapers and by attending
local gatherings and meetings in opposition to a transfer; some voiced their concerns on
television programs and in interviews, and through political lobbying, on both a state and
national level. But it would be difficult to say that the anti-rebellion forces reflected a
widely accepted “not in my backyard” philosophy that characterized local grassroots
environmentalism. To most people the public lands were far removed from where they
lived and worked, and few even followed the developments of the question over the
public lands, even if it was regularly plastered on the newspapers. The heart of the
opposition, in fact, was propelled by only a few individuals and not by a large segment of
the community.
Those who did speak out insisted that the West stood in jeopardy of becoming
like the East, with its attendant social and economic problems. Western resources ought
to be available to future generations for economic security and a high quality of life. In
the management of the public lands, this meant “sustained yield,” the notion that proper
land management would ensure that the land continued to provide economic and aesthetic
value from one generation to the next. The Utah Trails Council stated that “as our nation
grows, its impact on our natural resources becomes more significant and cannot be
ignored,” and that it was wrong to deny “those rights to others who have an equal interest
in those lands.” In this sense, environmentalists saw themselves as the keepers of a
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system that had deep roots in the American psyche. The controversial FLPMA, passed in
1976, was yet another significant strand in a long and unique system in the United States
of being responsible caretakers of the land.36
It was not that the environmentalists did not have their problems with federal land
management. The BLM was certainly not as sensitive to wilderness and wildlife
concerns as many environmentalists would have liked. But the choice between federal or
state ownership of the public land was not a difficult one to make. Opponents believed
that state title of the land would mean poor management, fewer funds for wildlife or
wilderness protection, and, ultimately, privatization. This latter point could not be made
with exact certainty, since never before had the state of Utah or any other western state
owned and managed tracts of land as vast as the public land under consideration. But it
was a point the environmentalists brought home to the public, warning that a seemingly
benign idea to transfer land was in fact a concealed attempt to place the land into private
ownership.
What of the argument that the Rebellion was little more than a land grab with the
ultimate objective to place the land into private ownership? There is evidence in private
correspondence and conversations to suggest that private ownership of the land was on
the minds of the original architects of rebellion. Robert List, Nevada’s governor,
supported the Nevada bill as a means of “getting as much of the productive land as
feasible into private ownership,” he wrote in a private letter to Dean A. Rhodes of the
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Nevada State Legislature.37 Utah’s own Senator Hatch was said to have remarked on
several occasions that if it were up to him the entire state would be placed in private
hands, and Cal Black wrote that privatizing the public land made economic sense:
“Obviously if the state were to dispose of every portion of these lands there is no longer a
financial burden to maintain them.”38 But these statements do not suggest that all
sagebrush rebels wanted to put the land up for public auction. When Ronald Reagan did
just that in his privatization initiative, some of the original groups and individuals who
supported a transfer, such as the Nevada Select Committee, resisted this action. Even
James Watt opposed the president’s public land sales.39
Indeed, it would be wrong to characterize the Rebellion as the environmentalists
did as one large “land grab.” Rebels were strange bedfellows and their reasons to support
the cause just as diverse. For some it was mainly a states’ rights issue, for others a
question of extracting the most from the land. But even the economic considerations
cannot be lumped into one category, for there were those who sincerely hoped to make an
economic living just as there were those driven by the insatiable lure of wealth.
It is clear from their activity and rhetoric that opponents took the threat of a
transfer seriously and not a mere “figment of someones imagination.” As a result,
through speeches, newsletters and the media they succeeded in shifting the dialogue the
rebels had begun and in diminishing much of the legitimacy the rebel cause may have
held in the public’s eye. Hatch, Black, and other leading Utah rebels may have supported
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carving the public lands into private lots, but they rarely said so in public.40 Yet, in the
end, the impact of the environmental opposition was nominal. It was the Reagan
administration that diffused the Sagebrush Rebellion and thus shifted environmentalists’
energies to other matters. After the threat of a transfer blew over, the environmentalists
continued to put pressure on congressional legislation and to fight specific issues related
to the public lands, but they did so comfortably knowing that the political winds would,
in time, shift in their favor. In this sense, then, however nightmarish the decade of the
1980s was for environmental organizations, a transfer would have presented an even
more frightening scenario.
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V.
THE DEMISE

I believe that this [LASER] conference may well mark the opening round of a fight that
will culminate very shortly in the most significant revitalization of state government since
the writing of the constitution.
Orrin Hatch

[Sagebrush Rebellion legislation] would be a premature piece of legislation that would be
a divisive force in Congress, unlikely of being passed at this stage and not advancing the
good neighbor policies that we need to advance at this time.
James Watt, Secretary of the Interior

Despite the best efforts of their opponents, by the summer of 1980, sagebrush
rebels enjoyed a broad base of support and popularity in both the rural and the urban
west. The results of public opinion polls in 1979 and, again, in 1981 conducted by the
Rocky Mountain Poll by the Behavior Research Center in Arizona traced a growing trend
in favor of more state control of federal lands. Utahns tended to be among the most
ardent supporters in the Intermountain West. The Salt Lake Tribune reported that over
two-thirds of the state’s citizens favored transferring the unappropriated public lands over
to the western states.1
This local support simply reflected larger trends that had begun to sweep the
nation in the political realm. The year 1980 marked the beginning of what some
1
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historians have called the “Reagan Revolution” and the triumph of the religious New
Right. This national trend played itself out on the regional (the West) and the state
(Utah) levels. With westerners among some of the most enthusiastic supporters of this
new conservative philosophy, sagebrush rebels philosophically aligned themselves
closely with Reagan, openly embracing an administration they felt would be responsive
to local and regional needs. “Reagan will resolve our problems,” one rebel scribbled in
his notes during a closed-door meeting held in Salt Lake City in August 1980. In that
same meeting, those in attendance thought it wise to postpone court litigation until after
the November elections, since it would undoubtedly be more favorably received under
the Reagan administration.2 In fact, the changed political scene and the resulting rally of
the sagebrush rebels took the Rebellion from being considered a local brushfire to a
viable threat with broad national support. The momentum abruptly ended, however, as
quickly as it had begun. This chapter chronologically takes the movement from its brief
climax to its unexpected and quite unspectacular demise—a look at its promise and at the
jolting and innovative turn of events that altered its course.
The emergence of a new conservative political culture really originated in the
1960s, with the conservative impulse strongest in the West and the South. The families
and individuals who lived in these regions generally held religious and moral values
strongly rooted in the American tradition. But according to historian Lisa McGirr, these
conservatives did not reject modernity; right-wing organizations tended to flourish among
the middle-class who embraced change, upward mobility, and modern lifestyle—the
salutary effect of hard work, enterprise, and “unabashed individualism.” Ideologically,

2
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the movement rejected the notion of “collectivism,” federal planning, and the social
welfare of FDR’s New Deal, Truman’s Fair Deal, and LBJ’s Great Society. Blaming
Washington for many of the “evils” of the economy, many westerners were anxious to rid
their region of the federal government; some extremists in Orange County, California,
went so far as to promote privatization of the police force, road construction, and the
school system. Yet despite the perception of its connection to extremist philosophy, this
new conservatism had come a long way by the 1970s and the 1980s, from the
overwhelming defeat of Barry Goldwater in 1964 to Reagan’s resounding mandate in
1980.3
Reagan embodied the image of a conservatism that became very much the product
of the West. An actor from California, he was the quintessential westerner, a man who
lived on a ranch with a hundred head of cattle and a few horses. His “western” persona
would carry with him into his political career. He made a name for himself campaigning
for Barry Goldwater in the 1964 presidential elections; two years later he won the
California gubernatorial elections and led one of the nation’s most liberal states during
some of its most turbulent years. In his bid for the presidency, Reagan ran on a platform
of lower taxes, laissez-faire economics, and reduced government—policies that pointed
to the “rugged individualism” of the West.
The connection between the new conservatism and the Sagebrush Rebellion was
hard to miss. In fact, one historian has noted that sagebrush rebels frequently drew from

3
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the rhetoric and philosophy of the New Right.4 A newspaper reporter called the new
conservative “an exotic variant of the old conservative Republican stock”—innovative,
open with the press, engaged in a broad range of issues.5 In many ways sagebrush rebels
reflected this approach to issues. They had mounted their own offensive, offering what
they considered to be an innovative, if radical solution to the problem of the public lands.
Their coalitions were moderately successful in getting their point across to the public
through newsletters, bulletins, articles, and speeches.
Sensing the political currency of the question of public lands, at least four
Republican presidential hopefuls expressed support for the Sagebrush Rebellion. John
Connally, a former Texas governor, publicly endorsed it and paid good money to air his
views on commercial television in 13 western states. Reagan, too, addressed the question
of public lands. One of his close political advisors happened to be Paul Laxalt, a senator
from Nevada and one of the original architects of the Sagebrush Rebellion. In his
campaign, Reagan promised to appoint a presidential commission to explore the reasons
for the inequity of public lands in the West and to draw out some solutions. In a
campaign stop in Salt Lake City the August before the election, he at least indicated his
personal feelings. “I happen to be one who cheers and supports the Sagebrush Rebellion.
Count me in as a rebel,” he reportedly stated.6
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Reagan won handily in the 1980 elections. Few were surprised that Jimmy Carter
lost all but five states in the continental United States—and every state west of the
Mississippi River except Hawaii and Minnesota—to a candidate who seemed to represent
and embody the West and its values. The election reflected the political divisions within
the Rebellion itself. From the beginning, most sagebrush rebels were Republicans, with
only nominal support from a small contingent of Democrats (Hatch’s bill, introduced in
August 1979, was said to have the senatorial support of 12 Republicans and only three
Democrats).7 With the election of Reagan the movement to transfer the public lands
became even more of a partisan issue and more permanently entrenched in the
Republican Party. Republican sagebrush rebels gained prominence and power with a
Republican majority in the Senate; some were members of the Steering Committee while
others, such as Utah’s Jake Garn and Orrin Hatch, were appointed to important
committee chairmanships.
There can be no doubt that for supporters of a transfer, the events of 1980
signaled progress. Adding to the exuberance of the November 2 elections, sagebrush
rebels from all over the West gathered in Salt Lake City three weeks later for what was
probably their largest and most important conference to date. The conference was
sponsored by the League for the Advancement of States Equal Rights (LASER),
informally organized in the summer of 1978 by Goldwater and John Harmer, a former
lieutenant governor of California whose name had been thrown around as a possible
nominee for the position of Interior secretary in the Reagan administration. A mother
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organization designed to pursue legal and legislative recourse, it was designed to gather
data, educate and inform the public, and assist states and individuals in gaining control of
the land. LASER was governed by a board of trustees and led by Harmer, Goldwater,
Senator Ted Stevens (R–AK), and two Utahns, Orrin Hatch and Calvin Black.8 Other
organizations had been formed to promote the Sagebrush Rebellion; Nevada’s Select
Committee, the Public Lands Council and Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc., with headquarters
in Idaho, were a few of these. But none was able to unite on a wide scale such a diverse
coalition of interests that backed a transfer to the states. An attempt was made in March,
1980, to solicit help from the private sector to lead such a coalition, but other than the
cattle industry, the mining, oil and gas, and timber industries did not show up for the
meetings scheduled in Washington.9
LASER, on the other hand, had the funding and the leadership to unite the
interests supportive of a transfer. This was plainly evident at its first conference in which
approximately 500 politicians, ranchers, concerned citizens, and nearly all of the key
rebels from throughout the West gathered at the Little America Hotel in Salt Lake City.
This particular conference brought together strange bedfellows and represented the varied
interests who had a hand in the land takeover. Some advocated a states’ rights position;
others simply argued in terms of efficiency and economics. There were folk representing
rural interests and concerns; more conspicuous were the big names in politics and the big
money in business and development. Their presence was certainly an indication that the
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movement to transfer the land was not lacking in funds. The registration for the threeday event was quite high at $145, a sum too steep for the average citizen. Sizable
donations from corporations, businesses, and a few individuals covered conference
expenses and added to a LASER budget in 1981 of over $1.5 million.10
The conference was designed to bring together such diverse interests in the quest
to reach some common goals. These were best expressed in the four resolutions passed
by conference participants. The resolutions urged state legislators to pass bills claiming
ownership of the public lands, organizations to work with the new administration and
congress for a solution, passage of national legislation pending in congress, and the
continuation of coordinating efforts begun by the conference. Keynote speakers
persistently sounded the theme of unity. Senators Hatch and Ted Stevens (R–AK) both
issued a call for unity and strategic oneness. In the words of Stevens, “We can’t change
policy that has been forged in the East unless we articulate our problems with one
voice.”11
If there was a unifying theme that all participants could agree upon, it was that
something needed to change if westerners were to have a say in determining their future.
A close review of the conference proceedings, however, actually reveals that views
varied as to how to achieve this goal. Speakers included “housewives, lawyers, ranchers,
hunters, economists, politicians, and concerned citizens,” with some advocating a transfer
of public lands to the state, others to private ownership. Conference-goers spoke on
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diverse themes ranging from the management of public lands and water to legal and
economic considerations.12
The overwhelming emphasis was on economic matters and on providing for the
needs of a western economy. Speakers criticized Jimmy Carter’s economic policies.
Malcolm Wallop, a Republican senator from Wyoming, stated that some 70 percent of
the nation’s gas and oil are on the public lands but output from these areas amounted to
only about 17 percent. Some as a sidelight mentioned preservation and aesthetic uses of
the land in their speeches, but these seemed forced in and certainly not a top priority.
When John Baden, Director of the Political Economy Research Group, spoke of the
“social benefits” that would accrue given state ownership of the public domain, he was
not concerned so much with the environmental or aesthetic benefits as much as the
economic benefits. In his view, the land ought to be developed for its rich resources and
transferred fee simple to “those in the private sector who value it most highly.”13
There were a sizable number of conference-goers who pushed to put the public
domain into private, not state, ownership. Darwin Van De Graff justified this position on
the basis that the Utah legislature had or would consider increasing taxes and rent
payments on state lands. He suggested that developers rethink their original support of a
transfer since states had begun to increase user fees. For this reason, in fact, the Utah
Petroleum Association (UPA) reconsidered its original support of a transfer. At the
conference, the director of the UPA, Darwin Van De Graff, predicted this would happen
“on a broader scale”: “The cold fact is, why would anyone want to transfer the land from
one manager to another if the result will be sharp increases in taxes, rents, and
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royalties.”14 Clearly, some westerners began to feel so emboldened by the recent election
to propose one extreme solution (privatization) in place of another (state ownership).
The LASER conference gave disgruntled westerners an opportunity to meet
together to brainstorm over the future of the public lands. There, they discussed a wide
array of issues and presented differing visions of the future of the lands—some markedly
different from one another. The conference did not result in a unified front, however, as
leading rebels had hoped. That the conference did not succeed in its goal of guiding
sagebrush rebels in the quest for state ownership of public lands is evident by the fact that
this was the first and only conference of its kind. This was partly due to the direction the
Reagan administration would take the public lands and to the divergent paths rebels took
to find redress for their grievances.
One of these paths was to depart from the original strategy of pursuing litigation
and legislation to pursuing redress within the new administration and federal land
bureaus. This was made possible with the election of a president who sympathized and
pledged to work in the interests of the West. Rebels recognized that the Reagan victory
opened up another avenue through which to address their grievances. Working through
the administration would not bring about a transfer, which still seemed unlikely even with
a Republican majority in the Senate, but it would do much to relieve some of the original
grievances that had served as a catalyst to promote a transfer in the first place. This new
strategy was what Norman Glaser called a rear assault, which involved “getting greater
cooperation, coordination, concessions, and so forth from the federal government at a
time when it appears that the federal bureaucrats are somewhat more receptive to the
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concerns of the various states.”15 This strategic shift really became noticeable during the
LASER conference and would become a significant factor in redefining the ultimate
objectives of the movement. More sagebrush rebels began to admit that this was what
rebellion was about in the first place.
Immediately following the conference proceedings, in the same rooms, two
subcommittee meetings were held by Congressmen James D. Santini, Nevada Democrat
and chairman of the House Subcommittee on Mines and Mining. In the first hearing the
idea of a transfer was discussed, with some of the same people who had endorsed this at
the LASER conference testifying. There, two proposed bills were also considered
regarding the leasing of public lands to oil and gas interests. Reportedly, much to the
humor of the press, Brian Beard of the Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club was the only
environmentalist to testify.16
The conference and hearings reintroduced the Sagebrush Rebellion into the
national spotlight, albeit briefly, on a scale not seen since it went national in August and
September, 1979. Nevada senator Dean Rhoads noted that the three major television
networks planned to highlight it in special segments and that it had received attention in
national newspapers and magazines, including The New York Times, New West, National
Geographic, and U.S. News and World Report.17 For its part in all of this, Utah, as the
host state of the LASER conference with a considerable number of influential and
determined sagebrush rebels, received a sizable share of attention.
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Riding the crest of the election and the conference, sagebrush rebels counted on
the momentum to lead to major developments in 1981. Reagan himself had wired rebels
attending the LASER conference of his support for a “sagebrush solution” to the public
lands question. By the end of 1980, five western states had passed bills asserting
ownership of the public lands and Senator Rhoads predicted that within another year 11
western states total “will be in the fold.” In December 1980, the Nevada legislature
appropriated additional funds to the attorney general’s office in preparation to take a
lawsuit to the High Court. Yet the election of Reagan convinced a majority of sagebrush
rebels that the appropriate strategy was to pursue a solution in Congress, not the courts.
As aforementioned, a LASER conference resolution officially supported a bill to be
introduced by Hatch in the coming year.18
Still, there was some question of what impact Reagan’s victory would have on the
public land. One sagebrush bulletin suggested Reagan do something similar to what
Thomas Jefferson did with the Alien and Sedition Laws by declaring federal ownership
of the lands to be unconstitutional.19 Wayne Aspinall warned that progress could remain
slow, even under Reagan; another, Senator James A. McClure, predicted that Reagan
would probably loosen the hand of the government in the management of the public
lands, but this, paradoxically, “may well take the steam out of the rebellion.”20
This is exactly what happened in the coming months and years due to the policies
and direction of one man: James G. Watt, Reagan’s new Secretary of the Interior. A
18
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native of Wyoming, Watt was the president’s youngest nominee, but at age 42 he already
had considerable political and legal clout. He held a degree in business and had served as
law review editor at the University of Wyoming. He became a legislative aide to
Milward Simpson, who was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1962, and later a lobbyist for
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. In 1969 he began work in the Interior Department as a
deputy secretary of interior to Walter Hickel. Until 1977 he worked in several positions
in Washington before becoming president of the Mountain States Legal Foundation.
With a healthy budget, the MSLF hired numerous conservative lawyers to work toward
conservative solutions. One test case aimed at holding a BLM officer liable for “denying
a person his civil rights”; others ranged from road construction permits to land grant
disputes.21 Given his controversial past, and particularly as president of MSLF, there was
some question as to how well his record would hold up in the confirmation hearing. But,
despite the fact that environmentalists believed Watt to be their most villainous opponent
ever to hold this position, he passed just fine and became Secretary of the Interior in
January 1981.22
21
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The personality and philosophy of Watt could not have contrasted more with his
predecessor, Cecil D. Andrus, an Idaho native and later governor of the state. Andrus
had sympathized with environmental causes and had been an outspoken critic of a land
transfer. He wrote several anti-rebellion articles published in national newspapers and
magazines, in one calling the Rebellion an attempt “to hornswoggle all Americans out of
a unique land heritage.” Like other opponents, he believed the Rebellion distracted from
the real issues central to land management, which he acknowledged had not yet been
resolved.23 Watt, on the other hand, could be seen sporting sagebrush rebel pins and
other paraphernalia at conferences and speaking engagements in which the public lands
were discussed. Sagebrush rebels hailed him as a savior of economic progress and
development, the man destined to take their movement to new heights.
Unwittingly, this assessment would be far off the mark; the new Secretary of the
Interior would ultimately and rather quickly take the foundation out from under the
movement for a public lands takeover. James Watt apparently had little intention of
pursuing a transfer. In his confirmation hearings, he stated: “I do not see the need now
for massive transfers of land. The Sagebrush Rebellion is caused by the arrogant attitude
of certain bureaucrats. Good management will defuse the Sagebrush Rebellion.”
Therefore, he introduced the so-called “good neighbor” policy and a four-pronged
strategy: emphasis on multiple-use, reduced dependence on foreign energy, a minerals
policy, and restoration of national parks and monuments.24 On March 6, to a House
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subcommittee, Watt declared, “I have not and I will not” support a transfer of the public
domain to the states.25
After the hard line Watt had previously taken, one wonders why he took this
position. Perhaps Watt struck a middle course so he could pass the hearing. Perhaps he
understood that if a transfer succeeded his department would lose a large part of its
responsibility. Whatever his motivation, within six months of his nomination his policies
diffused the idea of a transfer considerably. Instead, he emphasized the need to reduce
the backlog of repairs on national parks and denounced the proposed expansion of public
lands and parks. In addition, the Reagan administration and Watt asked for a survey of
lands that the federal government might transfer to the states. The direction he would
take public lands policy fulfilled what to him was the central goal of rebellion; at a
meeting of the Western Governor’s Conference in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, he reportedly
declared, “We have won the Sagebrush Rebellion!”26
In the meantime, Utah politicians suggested other solutions to the question of the
public lands. Congressman Dan Marriott, sensing that state ownership of the federal
lands was not feasible, proposed to introduce legislation that would set up a multiple-use
planning commission to manage federally owned land with Utah as the pilot state. He
said that this was the most logical situation and one that was supported by most
sagebrush rebels. The commission would involve personnel in the Interior Department,
state and local officials, land-users, and environmental groups.27
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Governor Matheson also had what he called a “new plan for public lands.” In
early 1981 Richard Dewsnup put together a memorandum in which he listed state
grievances on the public lands and outlined several solutions. Having developed a
rapport with the new secretary, Matheson sent this memo to the new Interior Secretary
and on February 10 the two met to discuss it. The governor especially was interested in
launching Project BOLD, the brainchild of Dewsnup and a proposal known as the
checkerboard exchange system. In a letter dated the next week, Matheson outlined the
project’s “essential elements.” His proposal, he wrote, would eliminate problem areas
between the federal and state governments “in one fell swoop.” If a remedy was not
made, he said, the conflicts would persist between the federal government and the public
land states. On February 13 he held a meeting in the Empire Building in downtown Salt
Lake City for the purpose of “consummating a statewide program of trades and
exchanges of fee title, surface rights and mineral estates.”28
Project BOLD had two center pieces—“blocking,” or “equal value” land
exchanges, and an amendment to the Federal Land Policy and Management Act so an
exchange would be possible. The governor created a project steering commission
charged with the task of evaluation and land reviews. A series of public meetings was
held in the fall, 1981, to discuss the proposals.29 Project BOLD, however, faced
formidable opposition from the media and from other groups. In his autobiography,
Matheson explained that the national media made it out to be an attempt to exchange
virtually worthless lands for valuable lands. He wrote that some people considered it to
be much too revolutionary; environmentalists objected that it was just “a backdoor
28
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approach to the Sagebrush Rebellion.” Even some rural county commissioners, such as
Cal Black, objected to it on the grounds that the State Land Board was not a benign land
agency. For years state officials pushed for land exchanges, but neither Matheson nor his
successor, Norman Bangerter, was able to see the proposals or the legislation through.30
Nevertheless, the governor considered this project to be a legitimate solution for
many of the western grievances and a means to diffuse the rebels’ original plan to enact a
large-scale transfer to the states of the public lands. This idea also received national
attention and provided a model for other western states to follow. The idea met with
some success with the Secretary of the Interior Department; at the annual conference for
western governors in the summer of 1981, Watt expressed his support to exchange
federal lands for state lands. He also announced that the Interior now required most
federal land officials to abide by state water laws, and that he planned to use the public
lands for multiple use, open several wilderness areas for development, and give states a
voice in federal energy developments within their state borders.31
Around the same time Project BOLD was launched and Watt became the Interior
Secretary, the decision was made not to pursue sagebrush rebellion litigation in the
courts. According to Senator Rhoads, the decision was made because the rebels would
certainly lose on a five to four decision in the Supreme Court and because the recent
elections provided new opportunities for “piece-meal legislation, administration actions,
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executive orders, and revamping of regulations.”32 The possibility of success though
legislative means also seemed unlikely, but as planned Hatch still sponsored a new bill in
Congress. The Public Lands Reform Act of 1981, S. 1245, introduced on May 20, was a
dressed up version of his 1979 bill. One of the few changes provided that the states
would be under the “same restriction currently governing federal land managers’
authority to sell lands to private interests.” The criteria for transferring land from states
to private interests, in fact, would be the same as outlined in FLPMA. By attaching such
a provision to the bill, Hatch hoped to alleviate fears that the bill was just another land
grab.
As before, Hatch argued that policy emanating from the local level would be more
efficient and responsible. But his primary argument was the same as it had always been:
his bill would provide for greater energy production and resource development designed
to jumpstart a lagging economy. “The lands eligible for transfer contain large mineral
and energy reserves such as oil, natural gas, coal, oil shale, tar sands, and uranium ore.
Federal ownership has been a roadblock to the development of this much needed energy
potential,” he stated in his newsletter.33
Hatch was among those westerners who insisted that the Rebellion was “alive and
well, despite some reports to the contrary.” His bill did have 15 co-sponsors in the
Senate and the companion bill sponsored by James Santini had 30 in the House. Cary
Peterson, Utah state senator and chair of the Western Conference of State Legislators,
was another who believed the support of a transfer of the public domain to the states was,
32
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in his own words, “‘alive and well’ in the West.” On December 7–9, he took part in the
quarterly business meetings of various committees of the Western Conference in Santa
Fe, New Mexico. There, at least 50 legislators from 13 states endorsed the general aims
of the Sagebrush Rebellion and a statement of public land objectives drawn up by the
Public Lands Committee, chaired by Utah State Senator Ivan Matheson. In a letter to the
secretary of the Interior Department in behalf of the Western Conference Executive
Committee, Peterson praised Watt’s “excellent administration of the Nation’s public land
laws” but also urged him to put an “increased priority” on the idea of a land transfer.34
It would be misleading to suggest that proponents of a land takeover had reason
for optimism. A report issued by the Public Lands Institute stated that the western states
had some of the most inadequate land agencies, with Utah topping the list. Moreover,
even with a conservative congress, it remained extremely unlikely that easterners would
ever agree to transfer the public lands. A serious blow to the Hatch bill came in June
when four senators—Malcolm Wallop (R–Wyo), Alan Simpson (R–Wyo), Dennis
DeConcini (D–Ariz.), and Gordon Humphrey (R–N.H.)—withdrew support for the bill,
reportedly out of allegiance and respect to the Interior Secretary. DeConcini believed
that the Sagebrush Rebellion had exhausted its usefulness now that a man sensitive to the
needs of the West controlled the direction of public land policy. He did warn, however,
that an administration could easily “fall into the old ways,” so “we must remain
vigilant.”35
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Most rebels probably recognized they could do little to revive the issue of a
transfer. After a short trip to D.C. in late 1981, Nevada rebel Dean Rhoads commented
that the legislation introduced in Congress was “practically dead.” He suggested shifting
the direction of the Rebellion to four key issues: disposal of surplus public land, federal
land exchanges, federal/state land exchanges, and privatization. Rhoads suggested
nothing revolutionary. His was a simple acknowledgment that new directions in public
land law had already begun to take place and that the central premise behind the rebellion
had become a dead issue.36 After 1981 the idea of a transfer never had much of a place in
discussions over the public lands. From time to time the term “Sagebrush Rebellion”
found its way into newspapers and articles over the next few years, but it was mostly
used in reference to a bygone movement of an earlier era.
Given the expectations of many for the Sagebrush Rebellion’s in 1981, it seems
surprising that that year marked the movement’s demise. Earlier that year LASER
published the proceedings of its conference but did little else thereafter to promote the
idea of a transfer. It never held another conference and its investors and political
supporters withdrew support rather quickly. One problem was that, in the words of one
historian, “rebels had considerable difficulty in building cross-state coalitions because of
the multiplicity of players involved.” Many were mainly concerned with local or state
issues and were less interested in fighting on the regional or national levels. And each
state approached the Sagebrush Rebellion with varying degrees of enthusiasm. Five
states had passed sagebrush legislation but ten other western states did not.37
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It is interesting that the election of 1980 played an ambiguous role in both
promoting and diffusing the Sagebrush Rebellion. Reagan’s election made possible the
appointment of James Watt, who essentially undercut the movement for a land transfer,
except for those lands considered surplus to federal needs. Many westerners and Utahns
agreed with Watt that a transfer of the public lands to the states would not be necessary.
This is ironic since sagebrush rebels looked to the 1980 elections as the best means to
make a reality the goal of a transfer. Although some rebels lost sight of this original
vision, others did not. A close review of correspondence, speeches, and other documents
indicates that some westerners—most notably Senator Hatch and Nevada state Senator
Norman Glaser—did not give up easily the original vision of local and state control of the
public lands. Glaser reportedly lamented in mid-1981, “He [Watt] might do too good a
job and reduce the vitality of our movement.” That is exactly what happened.38
Indeed, the quest to transfer large tracts of the public domain to the states became
a non-issue almost as quickly as it stood on the brink of success. A few sagebrush rebels
from Utah and elsewhere in the West tried to breathe new life into the idea of state
ownership of the public lands, but in 1981 and beyond it did not enjoy the publicity that it
had once had in the two years previous. This was not all bad, of course, since Watt’s
Good Neighbor policy solved many of the problems rebels fought in the first place. But
for sagebrush rebels who still pushed for state title to the land there was no guarantee in
four, eight or twelve years the same would not be the case on the other side of the
pendulum. That the original idea of a transfer did not succeed almost guaranteed that
western anger would not die. For many westerners the Reagan Revolution injected
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much-needed relief in the West, but it did not result in a lasting cure. Bernard DeVoto
predicted in the 1940s that it was only a matter of time before another group of
disgruntled westerners banded together to protest the situation of the public lands. The
West faced the same predicament following the demise of the Sagebrush Rebellion in
1981.
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EPILOGUE

Since the Sagebrush Rebellion faded quite unspectacularly in the early 1980s,
protest in the West has persisted. Rarely are the protests as loud or jolting, but they tend
to reflect similar grievances that have always been a part of the West.
Seasoned rebels sounding an old tune nearly eight years after Ronald Reagan was
elected in 1980, Senator Orrin Hatch and County Commissioner Cal Black predicted the
eruption of another rebellion if Democratic nominee Michael Dukakis won the 1988
presidential election. “[Democrats continue to] reflect the Carter philosophy that the
people who live here don’t have any rights to the land. Rather, the lands will be
protected for future peoples living somewhere else.”1
Dukakis did not win the election, but it was only a matter of time before some
westerners would be threatened by an administration that embraced the “Carter
philosophy.” In September 1996, Bill Clinton added fuel to the fire when he set apart 1.7
million acres in southern Utah as the Grand Staircase–Escalante National Monument.
Clinton’s Secretary of the Interior, Bruce Babbitt, who according to one reporter was on a
“mission from God,” had a “very long wish list” that ranged from reopening land for
wilderness consideration to the introduction of wolves into certain areas of the West. His
policies were vigorously opposed by many westerners, including a decision in 1999 to
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discontinue the leasing of coal in the newly created Escalante National Monument.2
More recently, the pendulum has swung back the other direction with the proposals of
George W. Bush and his administration to drill for oil in the Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge, to cater to timber and mining interests, and to limit several pieces of
environmental legislation.3
Some incidents seem curiously similar to the actions and philosophies of the
rebels in the late 1970s. In 1994, the same year Republicans secured a majority in both
congressional houses, a rancher and county commissioner in Nye County, Nevada, staged
a protest similar to the bulldozing incident in Moab in 1980. He chose July 4 as the day
to blaze a path on what was once a road but now lay on national forest land.4 In 1995, in
response to Babbitt’s proposal to increase grazing fees on the public lands, Utah
Congressman Jim Hansen introduced legislation to transfer about 270 million acres of
public lands to the states.5 This legislation, like those introduced in 1979, 1980, and
1981, never materialized, but still the anti-government sentiment in the West persists. A
recent article in the Deseret Morning News reported that the debate over wilderness is
simply a continuation of the Sagebrush Rebellion and that the anti-environmental forces
in Utah have generally won out: “Nowhere has the opposition been more formidable than
in Utah, where less wilderness has been created than in any other Western state except
Hawaii.”6

2

Diane Alden, “On a mission from God: Bruce Babbitt and the environmental movement: Part 1,”
http://www.enterstageright.com/archive/articles/1199babbitt.htm.
3
Carl Pope, “The 51 Percent Solution,” Sierra, January/February 2005, 6–7.
4
Jacqueline Vaughn Switzer, Green Backlash: The History and Politics of Environmental
Opposition in the U.S. (Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), xi.
5
Jim Woolf, “How the West was won, and won, and . . .” High Country News, October 16, 1995.
6
Henry Weinstein, “Utah is hottest anti-wilds ‘rebel,’” Deseret Morning News, October 31, 2004.

120

It seems likely that the sentiment manifested in the Sagebrush Rebellion is bound
to crop up every once in a while. In the West, views about the land’s best use varied
from person to person. Whereas some may have sought to set it aside for wilderness or
recreation, others wanted the land for economic development. It is not surprising that
many westerners tend to have a profound and meaningful relationship with the land, but
these relationships are not the same for everyone. Group affiliation, cultural norms,
divergent values, and individual needs—the need for recreation and solitude versus the
need for a job, for instance—normally play a role in public land issues, and the
Sagebrush Rebellion was no exception.
Of course, not all westerners maintain a deep connection to the land and many, in
fact, hardly associate themselves with it at all. These westerners may rightly be
described, in Richard Nixon’s phrase, as the “silent majority.” When it came to the
Sagebrush Rebellion, most people were either indifferent or had never heard of it. Even
in the West, where land, water, and resources have historically been the lifeblood, most
people did not follow developments of the BLM or uprisings like the Sagebrush
Rebellion. To say that the West is either predominantly rebel or environmental—or a
combination of the two—would be grossly misleading. Most people seem to live their
lives wholly disconnected to the land, and in this sense perhaps westerners are more alike
than not.
But even if land issues did not concern most westerners, the question over the
future of the public lands in the late 1970s was still a conflict between fundamental
western ideologies. The episode of the Sagebrush Rebellion brought out these two
extremes in the West as few others have done, revealing a culture in conflict and dramatic
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polarities. The West is an eclectic and diverse place of conservative and liberal,
individualism and cooperation, rural and urban, private and public. And the protests and
rhetoric over the public lands took place not so much among easterners and westerners as
they did among westerners themselves. Easterners paid less attention to the Sagebrush
Rebellion than did westerners whose home and future depended on the land and its
resources. Sagebrush rebels came from the West, of course, but so did the environmental
organizations that spearheaded the opposition. Even the federal land agencies during
both the Carter and the Reagan administrations were more western than not; the three top
officials over the public lands in Utah—Cecil Andrus, Frank Gregg, and Gary Wicks—
were all native westerners with a great deal of experience with western problems.
Both sides proactively advocated their own visions of the land and its future. And
both, not surprisingly, argued that precedence was on their side. Rebels frequently
contended that it was either outdated or unnecessary for Uncle Sam to hold on to the
public lands—especially during a period of economic uncertainty and energy crisis. State
ownership of the land, they argued, would loose the West from the shackles of
colonialism. The rebel vision of individual initiative and free enterprise had no room for
a foreign presence intent on keeping the West in colonial status. Conservative westerners
believed the federal government never should have gained title to the land in the first
place and that as a result the West was on an “unequal footing” with the East. It would
be difficult to dismiss this group as small and inconsequential; westerners who embraced
this ideology came from the rural and the urban regions and enjoyed a wide base of
support, as evident in part by the election of Reagan in 1980.
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The opponents of a transfer, on the other hand, argued that westerners had always
been able to make a living, some even prospering and growing rich to the detriment of
the earth and its environment. Their view was that the history of the American West was
one of abuse, destruction, and indiscriminate waste, and it was for this reason that the
federal government initiated much-needed controls and regulations. Conservation and
resource management had become such a fixture in the West that Congress seemed to
hang onto the lands, quipped one sagebrush rebel, Kenneth Creer, “to preserve them as a
playground of ‘Old West’ nostalgia.” Rebels believed public ownership of the land was
an outdated system, while anti-rebel westerners pointed to the absence of management
controls and the parceling of the public lands into private property as archaic and
obsolete. In both cases westerners attempted to create a memory of the western past that
was congruous with modern ways of thinking and living, and both sides used symbols
and rhetoric that connected their cause to history and gave to it a sense of legitimacy. It
does not seem surprising that people remember the past as it suits them in the present and
as it reinforces political and social ideologies.
The extremes on both sides were manifest quite plainly in Utah, where for two
years national and state politicians, cattlemen and rural other people, environmentalists,
and concerned citizens debated the purpose and meaning of a land transfer.
Environmentalists in Utah like Dick Carter and Bern Shanks were among the most
effective in the entire West in countering the arguments of the rebels. Yet Utah rebels
were also among the national leaders and had the publicity and clout to attract widespread
attention. The people and events that took place in Utah suggest that there was some
variance among western states. But elsewhere the scenario was the same; the Sagebrush
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Rebellion revealed a divided and frustrated West—to borrow from Bernard DeVoto, “the
West against itself.”
The opponents of a transfer could rejoice that neither Congress nor the American
public as a whole gave the Sagebrush Rebellion much thought or serious consideration.
But even if the movement failed to reach its initial and central goal, rebels made some
lasting gains. On a collective scale, westerners rallied to have a voice in determining the
future of the public lands and found a forum through which to express their grievances.
At least in part they succeeded in bringing land issues squarely to the public and in
forcing their foes into some form of cooperation. Federal officials, state officials, and
westerners of all stripes made some concessions by working to better federal–state
relations. And the appointment of James Watt ensured that the question of public lands
would be a central and vital national issue.
But to say that one side or the other won the battle for the public lands would be
misleading. Some real gains were made, but both camps tended to advocate rather
extreme positions which made it difficult to talk through issues when cool-headed
dialogue was necessary. A continual onslaught of rhetorical attacks only further
polarized the two camps. The largely symbolic actions of the sagebrush rebels such as
the bulldozing and the legislation passed on a state level probably did not help the rebel
cause, since they were not perceived by the public to be real and legitimate solutions.
The Sagebrush Rebellion further divided the West, came a long way from solving
“western” problems, and unveiled some of the more sinister aspects of the western
experience.
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In the end, the story of this wholly western episode reveals the fundamental
diversity and eclectic variety of the West, both past and present. The modern West, just
as the Old West once was, continues to be a place where people and ideas converge and
come in conflict. Westerners would do well to understand and accept this diversity, for
the two groups that spoke so loudly more than twenty-five years ago will likely continue
to influence the ongoing drama of the American West. With deep roots in the western
psyche, the differing visions that revealed themselves quite dramatically in the 1970s and
1980s are bound to remain in contrast as long as people continue to attribute profound
and varied meaning to the land, whose functions vary from a means of economic survival
to a place of heritage and spiritual renewal. As long as land means all this and perhaps
more, westerners will no doubt continue to debate its use and future. From time to time,
these debates seem certain to be, in all their vivaciousness and variance, much like the
Sagebrush Rebellion.
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